POLNDEXTER vs. ANDERSON.

where use was devised in land, the seisin was not executed to the
use, because devises were not among the conveyances enumerated
in the statute of that State. (2 Leigh Rep. 359).
It has been the endeavour in these pages to furnish an accurate
account of the nature and principles of the doctrine of uses; of
the manner and extent of its adoption in this country; with a
general view of its operation as an element of the American law of
conveyance. And, although the subject may have been but imperfectly considered and presented, it is, at least, believed that the
statements which have been made, will be found to be clearly borne
out and upheld by the authorities. Through these, it will be
seen that the English doctrines have been essentially incorporated
into our law; and that, even in those States where the theory of
raising a use under the statute of uses is dispensed with, and the
same operation given by distinct legislation to a deed of conveyance,
estates may nevertheless be deemed to pass by way of use.
We have purposely abstained from dwelling upon the subtle and
technical distinctions with which the books abound, in regard to
shifting, secondary, springing, or contingent uses; as well as from
inquiring into local regulations, and various incidental matters, more
minutely, and at greater length of detail than the general character
and design of our article would seem to warrant. It is hoped that
what has been written, if not fully illustrative of the subject in
every particular, will be considered not altogether useless as a
tolerable delineation of some of its more striking and important
A.
features.
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In the Supreme Court of Ohio.
POINDEXTER ET AL. VS. ANDERSON, ET AL.
1. The lex loci contractusmust govern both as to the status of the parties, and the
subject matter of the contract.
2. Although an actual change of domicile, by consent of the master, from a slave to
a free State, has the effect to manumit a slave, yet a mere sojouT in Ohio, or
transit through the State, by a slave domiciled in Kentucky, does not have such
effect.
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3. Although involuntary servitude can not be required, in Ohio, of a negro slave
from Kentucky sojourning in this State, yet where a negro slave domiciled in
Kentucky, after having been in Ohio on an errand, or in itinere, has voluntarily
returned to his State of servitude in Kentucky, his status as a slave continues by
the laws of that State, and must be recognized by the courts of Ohio, when brought
under consideration in connection -witha contract make in Kentucky.
BARTLEY,

C. J.-Although I concur in the judgment pronounced,

I differ so essentially with the majority of the court as to the main
ground upon which the decision has been placed, that it is proper
that I should state my own views fully, in a separate opinion.
The original suit was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas
of Clermont County, on the 24th day of July, 1852, in which the
plaintiff in error declared in assumpsit, on two promissory notes,
dated August 22d, 1848, each payable to plaintiff, in the sum of
one hundred dollars; one in two, and the other in three years, after
date, and each executed in the State of Kentucky. Poindexter,
the principal in the notes, was not served with process. The defendants plead: 1st, Non Assumpsit; 2d, That these notes were given
upon a promise of the plaintiff that he would, in due form of law,
set free Henry Poindexter, then claimed by him as his slave, but
that plaintiff had not kept said promise; 3d, that said notes'were
given in consideration that the plaintiff, in whose service said Henry
Poindexter had been, as his slave, for many years, would set him
free; whereas, in truth, said Poindexter was at that time legally
free, and not a slave, by means of the fact, that the plaintiff had on
several occasions prior to that time, permitted said Poindexter to
come into the State of Ohio, there to remain for a time, to wit, one
day, by means whereof he was emancipated. Issue was taken on
these pleas.
After judgment for the defendants, in the common pleas, the
cause was appealed to the District Court, where judgment was also
rendered for the defendants; and to reverse this judgment this proceeding in error is brought.
A bill of exceptions was taken on the trial, in the District Court,
setting out the evidence, from which it appears, that prior to, and

POINDEXTER vs. ANDERSON.

at the time of the date of the notes declared on, the plaintiff resided
in Campbell county, Kentucky, about one mile from the Ohio river,
having Poindexter in his service, as his slave, worth about one
thousand dollars; that Poindexter bargained with Anderson, his
master, for his freedom, and gave him the notes declared on, and
two others, for one hundred dollars each, falling due subsequently;
that the defendants served with process signed the notes as sureties
for Poindexter; that the contract was made, and the notes given,
in the State of Kentucky; that on the delivery of the notes by
roindexter to plaintiff, the latter relinquished his control over the
former as his slave, and agreed that as soon as the notes were paid,
he would give him. his freedom papers; that after the arrangement,
the plaintiff employed Poindexter to work for him for a time, in
Kentucky; subsequently, he (Poindexter) came into Ohio, to work,
and was in this State at the time of the commencement of the suit;
and that prior to the date of the notes, Poindexter, while in the
service of Anderson, as his slave, had been permitted by his master,
on several occasions, to go across the river, into the State of Ohio,
on errands, being once sent by plaintiff over the river, to New Richmond, for a physician; but that Poindexter always voluntarily
returned, without delay, from such errands, to his master, in Kentucky. The intervention of a jury having been waived, and
the cause submitted, the court found for the defendants. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, but the motion was overruled, and judgment rendered; whereupon the plaintiff took his bill of exceptions.
It is now assigned for error, that the finding of the court was
against the law and the evidence; and that, upon the case made
out, the court erred in rendering judgment for the the defendants,
instead of the plaintiff.
That the contract in this case, having been made in Kentucky,
must be governed by laws of that State controlling the legal capacity
of the parties, as well as its subject matter; that Poindexter, the
principal in the notes, being the slave of the plaintiff, had no legal
capacity, under the jaws of that State, to make a valid contract
with his master; that he was not set free in accordance with the
municipal regulations of that State ; that a mere executory agree-
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ment of the master with his slave (or even with another person),
that he would, at a future time, or on a future contingency, set the
slave free, has no legal efficacy in that State, and therefore can
constitute no legal consideration for a contract (Willis vs. Bruce, 8
B. Monroe, R. 548, and Cartervs. Sepper, 5 Dana, R. 261); and
that the contract of suretyship, being merely accessory to that of
the principal, is without any validity when that of the principal is
absolutely void; are propositions to which I readily accede. And
upon this ground I give my assent to the judgment in this case.
But the main ground upon which the decision of the case is placed,
by the opinion of the majority of the court, is, that Poindexter, by
means of his having been sent into Ohio, by his master, on an
errand, prior to the giving of the notes, although he had returned
voluntarily, and without delay, to the service of the plaintiff, became
a freed man, and that therefore, the notes, being given for the purchase of his freedom, were without consideration. It is not pretended that Poindexter had been domiciled in Ohio, or even, that he
had entered the borders of the State for a temporary residence.
On the contrary, he was simply in the State, in itinere, on business
not requiring a prolonged or indefinite sojourn, and, as far as residence is concerned, not distinguishable from that of a person in.
transitu. The plea goes no further than an averment, that he had.
entered the territory of the State, and left, on his voluntary return
to the service of his master, in Kentucky, on the same day. The
effect of the doctrine on which the decision is placed is, that if 3,
person, who is a slave by the laws of another State, should, by the
consent of his master, even in itinere, or upon an errand, "step
upon the soil and breathe the atmosphere of Ohio," he becomes a.
freed man, and is forever absolved from the right of his master to
his servitude in the State to which he belongs, even after his voluntary and immediate return to the service of his master; and that
he must be so regarded by the courts of Ohio, whatever may be the
laws of the State of his domicile to the contrary. This position, as
I humbly conceive, is novel in our jurisprudence, and has so important a bearing upon cases of frequent occurrence, affecting the
6
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harmony and safety of the country, that I cannot consent to pass it
without an explicit statement of the grounds of my dissent.
Was Henry Poindexter a slave at the time the promissory notes
were given to the plaintiff, in the State of Kentucky? Thathe had
been the plaintiff's slave, under the laws of Kentucky, some time
prior to the execution of the notes, is admitted by the pleadings,
and shown by the proof; and that, by the transaction in which the
notes were given, Poindexter and his sureties admitted the fact
that he was, at that very time, such slave, must be conceded. And
in no ordinary case, in a court of law, would a party be allowed to
contradict, his own solemn admission, in a matter of contract, upon
which he had induced the other party to act, and part with his claim
or property. It is not pretended, in the defense, that the plaintiff
had obtained his right to the servitude of Poindexter by any unfairness or illegality. And while it appears in the proof, that he was
worth one thousand dollars as a slave, and which, of course, the
plaintiff could have received for him on a sale, yet that the plaintiff,
governed by an- indulgent regard for the wishes of Poindexter,
agreed to set him free for the sum of four hundred dollars, payable
on extended credits. Under such circumstances, shall one party,
after he has induced another to part with his claim of property, on
a pretended contract, be allowed to come into a court of justice,
and either by stultifying himself,, or admitting that he had been
practicing an artifice on the other party, avoid his liability, without
restitution, or placing the other party in the situation he was before?
In such case, the principle of estoppel would ordinarily be applied.
But it is said, that Poindexter and his sureties were ignorant of
the rule of law by which he had become free, and that they gave
the notes under a mistaken belief that he was a slave at that time..
Without stopping to consider the application-of the rule, ignorantia
juris non excusat, I proceed at once to the inquiry, was Poindexter
legally held to the service of the plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the notes? And the inquiry is, not whether Poindexter
was to be considered a slave according to the laws of Ohio, but
whether he was actually a slave under the laws of Kentucky, where
he had been, and wag actually residing at that time. The inquiry
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here, as to his condition, involves simply the consideration of the
contract for the purchase of his freedom. Whatever might have
been the laws of Ohio in that regard, if the plaintiff could have
held him to service under the laws of Kentucky, or even had it been
a controverted question, whether that was the case or not, it would
have been sufficient to furnish a valuable eonsiderationfor the contract. It is a principle of general application, universally recognized, that the lex loci contractus must govern as to the nature and
validity, as well as the interpretation of contracts. And this is
founded, not alone upon necessity and commercial convenience,
but also upon the fact, that parties are presumed to contract in contemplation of the existing lws of the place; and, so far as such
laws have relation to the subject matter of the contract, they enter
into and constitute terms in the conditions of the contract itself.
Where a contract is made in one State, but performance is required
in another State, or where one or both the parties reside in one
State, and the contract is made in another State, questions are
sometimes made as to the local laws governing the contract. And
it is held, that while considerations affecting the validity of contracts, which have their foundation in the State or condition of a
person, must be governed by the laws regulating the State and condition of the person, which is the law of his domicile; yet, considerations affecting rights arising out of the nature or subject matter of
the contract, must be always governed by the laws of the place of
the contract. But where the place of the domicile of both the
parties, and the place both of the making and of the performance
of the contract, are the same, the rule, I believe, is without exception, that the local laws of that place mgst govern every where, as
to the nature, validity, and interpretation of the contract. Hence
it is, that contracts made in one State, and valid by its laws, may
be enforced in the courts of another State, notwithstanding the fact,
that had they been made in the latter State, they might have been
invalid by the operation of its local laws affecting either their subject matter, or the state or tordition of the person of either of the
parties.
It appears in this case, that the State of Kentucky was not only
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the place of the contract in question, but also the place of the domicile of both the parties. It is not pretended that at the time of the
making of the contract, Ohio was the place of the domicile of Poindexter, by birth, and it certainly had not then become such by choice.
The constitution and laws of Kentucky recognize slavery as a
legal condition, and regulate the relation of master and slave, by
providing guaranties for the security of the rights of the master,
charging him with the custody of his slave, and enjoining upon him
the duties essential to the maintenance and security of the relation.
And the mode of manumission in that State is expressly prescribed,
and can be affected only by a formal deed of emancipation, executed
through the agency of public authority.
And, inasmuch as slavery has existed under various forms and
modifications, in different ages, and different nations of the world,
it is proper to add, that the relation of master and slave, as it exists
in Kentucky, does not give the master absolute dominion over the
life and person of the slave; and while it gives to the former the
exclusive right to the labor or services of the latter, and the right
to direct and control his actions with that view, it imposes upon the
master reciprocal obligations for the support and maintenance of
the slave, at all times, whether in sickness, in health, or in old age.
And the fundamental law of that State contains a provision, "to
oblige the owners of slaves to treat them with humanity, to provide
for them necessary clothing and provisions, and to abstain from all
injuries to them, extending to life or limb." Article 7, Sec. 1,
Constitution of the State of KYentucky.
The status or civil and political capacity of a person being conceded, the social and political organization of the State to which he
belongs must be regarded every where as determined by the civil
regulations of the place of his domicile. It is said that every State
or nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within
its own territory; and that its laws affect and bind all persons and
property located within it. It has power to regulate the mode and
condition under which property may be acquired and held; the
capacity, state, and condition of all persons domiciled therein; as
well as to prescribe the remedies and modes of proceeding in the
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administration of justice. This is essential to the sovereignty of
every distinct and separate community of people.
And it appears to be well settled, that the capacity, state and
condition of a person, as to acts done, rights acquired, and contracts
made, must be regarded, every where, as fixed and determined by
the laws of his domicile: so that, if these acts, rights and contracts
have validity there, they will be held equally valid everywhere;
but if invalid there, they will be held invalid everywhere. Story's
Conflict of Laws, see. 101.
Although the status of a person is not indelible, but liable to be
changed by a change of domicile; yet the domicile is not liable to
change by a mere temporary absence from it, the intention of
returning to it still continuing. On this subject, Mr. Justice Story,
in his work on "Conflict of Laws," see. 4 4, says:
Two things must concur to constitute domicile; first, residence; and, second , the
intention of making it the home of theparty.

There must be thefact, and the intent;

for, as Pothier has truly observed, a person cannot establish a domicile in a place,
except it be animo etfacto.

However, in many cases, actual residence is not indis-

pensable to retain a domicile, after it is once acquired; but it is retained animo

aole, by the mere intention not to change it, or to adopt another. If, therefore, a person leaves his home for temporary purposes, but with an intention to return to it
this change of place is not in laV a change of domicile. Thus, if a person should
go on a voyage to sea, or to a foreign country, for health, or for pleasure, or for
business of a temporary nature, with an intention to return, such a transitory residence would not constitute a new domicile, or amount to an abandonment of the
old one; for it is not the mere act of inhabiting in a place which makes the domicile; but it is the fact, coupled with the intention of remaining there, animo
manendi.

It is dun established principle, that the.personal status of a party,
as fixed by the law of the place of his domicile, is regarded as
accompanying him in other countries, so long as his domicile
remains unchanged. See Story's Conflict of Laws, sees. 51, 52, 60,
64, 65 and 66; 2 Kent's Com.; Pattee vs. Brown, 5 East. 131;
1 Huberus, Lib. 1, tit. 3, see. 12.
Thus the relation of husband and wife, if valid by the laws of the
domicile of the party, has a legal ubiquity of obligation, and will be
regarded as valid in every other country where the party may go.
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So also with the relation of parent and child. And if by the la),.
of the place of domicile, a child become of age, and discharged from
the control of the parent at the age of twenty-one years, he will be
regarded as having reached his age of majority, if he go to a country where a person does not become of age till he reach his twentyfifth year. And if a parent, domiciled in a country -where the age
of majority is fixed at twenty-five years, be sojourning in this State
with a son over twenty-one, but under twenty-five years of age, the
rights and the obligations of the relation of parent and child would
be regarded and enforced. So, also, is the relation of guardian
and ward, and likewise the relation of master and apprentice,
regarded in different countries, and the rights and obligations thereof
enforced.
This rule, however, is subject to the qualification, that where the
rights and obligations incidental to the personal status are in contravention of the laws of another country, in which the party may
be a sojourner, they may be, for the time being, to some extent, suspended. But although the rights and obligations incident to the
capacity, state or condition of a party, may be thus temporarily
suspended for want of the authority of law to support, or to enforce
them, they are not thereby abrogated, and the status of the party
changed by the operation of the laws of the place of the sojourn.
It is true, 'if a party remove with the intention of changing his
domicile, as soon as he arrives in the country or State of his new
home, his status is at once changed, and fixed by the laws of the
place of his new domicile, And what amounts to a change of domicile, as affecting his status, may depend somewhat upon the laws of
the country to which the party may go. If he remove from the
place of his domicile to another country, with the intention of residing there temporarily, but for a considerable and indefinite period
of time, or for a number of years, it may effect a change of domicile. But it may be said without fear of contradiction, that it never
has been held, in any well considered case, by any court, in any
country, that a change of domicile may be effected by the act of a
person leaving his home f6r a mere temporary purpose, and simply
passing through another country on a journey, or going into it on.
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business requiring no delay even for a temporary residence, and
immediately returning to the place of his home.
And not only do the rights and obligations incident to the domestic relations, but also the rights of personal or moveable property,
as fixed by the jus domieilii, accompany the person of the owner in
other States or countries. And this, in the words of Lord Loughborough, in Sill vs. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 690, "is a clearproposition, not only of the law of England, but of every country in the
world where law has the semblance of science." And in the important case of Birtwhistle vs. Vrardill, 4 Barn. & Cres. 438, Lord
Chief Justice Abbott, recognizing this doctrine, said, "Personal
property has no locality. And even with respect to that, it is not
correct to say, that the law of -Englandgives way to the law of the
foreign country; but, that it is a part of the law of England that
personal property should be distributed accordingto the jus domicilii." "And the same doctrine," says Story, in his Conflict of
Laws, see. 830, "has been constantly maintained, both in England
and America, with unbroken confidence, and general unanimity."
This doctrine, that rights of personal property, and rights and
obligations incident to the domestic relations, acquired by the laws
of the place of domicile, will be regarded and enforced in other
States and countries, rests upon a principle of international jurisprudence, founded upon the comity of nations, and has so. general a
sanction among civilized nations, that it is now treated as a
,]
part of the " Jus
aentium." It does not arise from any extra territorial operation of the laws of one country within the limits of
another. In the words of Chief Justice Abbott, "It is not correct
to say, in respect to this, that the law of Englandgives way to the
law of the foreign country." On the contrary it becomes a part of
the municipal law of the country adopting it. 'And because it is
founded on the comity of nations, it is no less the law of each country where it is enforced. In Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Pet.
R. 589, Chief Justice Taney said, on this subject, "The comity
thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty.
It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is
inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its inter-
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ests. But it contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong, that courts of justice have constantly
acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations."
This rule of law, founded upon comity prevailing among the distinct and independent nations of the earth, rests upon still higher
obligations among the people of the several States of the American
Union. Having entered into a league of friendship and solemn
compact with each other, as the basis of a confederated government,
designed to providefor the common defense and general welfare of
the several States, to secure to,each its liberty, and to establish justice,.and insure domestic tranquillity, they established intimate
relations, and laid the foundation for unrestrictedandfree commercial and social intercoursebetween the people of the several States;
and that, too, when the relation of master and slave actually existed,
to some extent, in every State of the confederacy. Having guaranteed to the people of each State inviolability in their rights of
private property, and security in their domestic tranquillity; having declared that the powers enumerated in the Constitution should
not be construed to deny or disparage the rights retained by the
people; and having guaranteed the sovereignty and independence
of each State, subject only to the powers delegated to the confederacy, they recognized the relation of master and servant, secured
the return of fugitives from servitude, and provided, expressly, that
"Pullfaith and credit shall be given, in each State, to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State.;" and
that " The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
United upon such intimate relations, for such purposes, and upon
such terms, under the same confederated government, the people of
each State are bound, if not by the express obligations, certainly
by the spirit and true intent of the compact, to regard with the
strictest fidelity, and in the most amicable spirit of reciprocity, all
the peculiar rights of the people of each other State, which separate
and independent nations, in their intercourse with each other,
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recognize in regard to the ordinary rights of persons and property,
upon the ground of comity. Without this, the harmony required
to insure " domestic tranquillity," and the free commercial and
social intercourse, between the people of the several States, essential
to the great purposes of the confederacy, cannot be secured. The
citizens of each State cannot expect long to enjoy " all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," unless each
State maintains a scrupulous regard for comity and reciprocity in
this respect. A citizen of Ohio, passing through Kentucky, or
going into that State on business, either with his property, or with
persons under his guardianship, would expect to be protected in his
rights of person and property, held by the laws of his place of domicile, under "the fullfaith and credit" required to be given to the public acts of his State. But if a citizen of Kentucky cannot pass through
Ohio, accompanied by his servant, or send his servant into this State
on a mere errand, without being divested of his rights secured to him
by the piblic acts of the State of his domicile, there is an end to
that comity and reciprocity between the two States required by
their relations toward each other as members of the federal compact,
which is essential to harmony and unrestricted intercourse between
the people of the two States. And such a course on the part-of
Ohio will subject her citizens to a liability to retaliatory measures
on the part of Kentucky.
If Ohio and Kentucky were separate and independent nations,
absolved from all obligations under the federal compact, Kentucky
could doubtless secure, by treaty stipulations, protection to the
rights of persons and of property authorized by her own laws, and
effective provisions against the invasion of 'such private rights, in
the commercial and free intercourse between the people of the two
States, which is manifestly the interest of each. But if the citizens
of Kentucky cannot be protected in their rights vested in that State,
while mere sojourners or travellers in Ohio; if the people of Ohio
can be allowed to interfere with the local policy and domestic affairs
of Kentucky, and entice away negroes bound to servitude in that
State; if the people of Ohio tolerate and encourage political move-
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ments, agitation, and incendiary publications, directly tending to
disturb the domestic tranquillity of Kentucky, to instigate the negro
there to insurrection and murder, and compelling the people of that
State, as necessary measures of self-preservation, to prohibit the
negro from being taught to read, and to impose rigid police regulations, which prevent all amelioration in the condition of the slave,
and cut off all progress in the cause of emancipation ;-if all this
can be done, consistently with the spirit and true intent of the
federal compact, the federal Union must be found far less efficient
as a protection to the people of the several States in their local
policy and private rights of person and of property, than .mere
treaty 'stipulations between States foreign to, and independent of
each other.
But it is said that the Constitution of Ohio declares all men free,
and prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, except for crime,
and that this provisian of our Constitution cannot be abrogated or
suspended by the operation of the laws of Kentucky. This is all
very true, but it in no wise, as I humbly conceive, affects the question under consideration. No one would ever assert such an
absurdity as that the fundamental laws of Ohio could be abrogated,
or- suspended, by the extra territorial operation of the laws of a
foreign State. It is undeniable, that the Constitution and laws of
Ohio govern the status and condition of every person domiciled in
the State. And if a person remove from another country into Ohio,
intending to make Ohio his home, he becomes subject, at once, as
to his rights of person and property, to the laws of Ohio; and if his
removal be from Kentucky, and he bring with him his slave, from
the time of his landing in Ohio, the slave, at once, becomes free.
This results from the operation of the laws of Ohio, in case of a
change of domicile, or of persons taking up their residence in this
State. But when the citizens or subjects of another State or country
simply pass through, or sojourn in Ohio, either on business, or
merely as travellers, they occupy a different relation, and are subject
to regulations differing from those which apply to persons domiciled
or residing in the State. A standard author, of the highest character, on the Laws of Nations, says:
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The citizen or subject of a State who absents himself for a time. without any

intention to abandon the society of which he is a member, does not lose his privilege
by his absence; he preserves his rights, and remains bound by the same obligations.
Being received in a foreign country, in virtue of the natural society, the communication, and commerce which nations are obliged to cultivate with each other, he

ought to be considered there as a mzember of his own nation, and treatedas such.
The State, which ought to respect the rights of other nations, and, in general,
those of all mankind, cannot arrogate to herself any power over the person of a
foreigner, who, though he has entered her territory, has not become her subject.

Vattel's Law of Nations, page 174.

Again, the same author, on page 175, says:
The property of an individual does not cease to belong to him on account of his
being in a foreign country: it still constitutes a part of the aggregate wealth of his
nation. Anypower, therefore, which the Lord of the territorymight claim over the

property of a foreigner. would be equally derogatory to the rights of the individual
owner, and to those of the nation of which he is a member.

The provisions of the Constitution of the State mentioned must,
therefore, be construed as fixing the laws of domicile in Ohio, and
as governing the state and condition of those only who are, or who
become, subjects of the State government. This certainly cannot
be otherwise. The language is general, and without exception,
declaring all men free and equal; yet it is conceded, that a fugitive
from labor coming into Ohio from another State, is not free, but
subject to be returned to his master. And it must be conceded
that ambassadors, or other foreign ministers, might reside in Ohio
with their servants, and yet retain their domicile, with the rights
incidental thereto, in the country which they represent, and to
which they belong. In some countries, and in some of the States of
the Union, special laws are enacted, regulating the privileges and
liabilities of sojourners, and transient persons within the State; and
those statutes, in some of the States, by express provision, fix the
period beyond which sojourning slaves from any of the slaveholding
States shall not be allowed to remain. But we have no such law in
Ohio.
It is argued, that foreigners or non-residents coming into, or passing through the State, cannot be allowed to violate the constitutional prohibition against the existence of slavery' or involun-
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tary servitude in the State. This is conceded. Nothing different is claimed. The prohibition is against slavery or involuntary servitude as a state and condition of man in Ohio. The
slavery prohibited consists in the right of one person to hold another
.erson and his posterity in perpetual bondage to labor in Ohio,
without compensation, save the reciprocal obligation of the master
to support his slave. And "the involuntary servitude" inhibited
is the same thing, with the exception, that the bondage may not be
for the entire life of the servant, nor involve his posterity. Now,
it is not claimed that a citizen of Kentucky can come into Ohio
with his slave, and assert a right to the perpetual labor of the slave
and his posterity in Ohio; neither is it claimed, that a citizen of
Kentucky can either bring, or send his slave into Ohio, and require
of him, or coerce him to involuntary servitude in this State. But
if a slave, sent into this State on an errand, voluntarilydoes an act
of service for his master; or if a slave accompany his master in
travelling through this State, and voluntarily serve his master on
his journey, in neither of these cases, is there any act of involuntary servitude. The constitutional inhibition is against "involuntary servitude ;" and this is no more violated by a gratuitous voluntary act, than it is by an act done under the obligations of a contract. The real question, however, under consideration is, not
whether a man in Kentucky can send, or bring his slave into Ohio,
and here require of him, or coerce him, to acts of involuntary servitude; but whether, after a slave has been in Ohio, by permission
of his master, on a mere errand, performed an act of voluntary service, and then, voluntarily returned, without delay, and without
claiming his freedom, to his state of servitude in Kentucky, the
actualstatus of the slave, as fixed by the laws of Kentucky, can be
judicially recognized in Ohio. It is the mere question of the recognition in Ohio, of a legal right and condition incontestably existing
by law in Kentucky. The recognition in Ohio, of the fact of an
existing legal right in the State of Kentucky, is one thing, and a
right to the involuntary servitude of a person in Ohio, another and
very different thing. If a suit be brought in Ohio, on a note given
on the purchase of a slave in Kentucky, it will be conceded, that
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th6 contract will be enforced, and that the consideration can not be
impeached. And yet this would be as perfect a recognition, in
Ohio, of the legality of slavery in Kentucky, as that of authorizing
a master to coerce the return, of a slave to Kentucky, who came
into Ohio on a temporary purpose by consent of his master. A
mere act of voluntary service in Ohio can not be construed to be
coercive or involuntary servitude. Much less can the mere recognition in Ohio, of a legal right actually existing in Kentucky, be
tortured by construction, into a recognition of involuntary servitude
in Ohio; and as it has reference to the operation of laws in Kentucky only, it is manifestly not giving an extra territorial operation to the laws of that State. I am wholly unable, therefore,
to perceive 'the infraction of the constitutional inhibition complained of.
That slavery is contrary to the policy of Ohio, as established by
the Constitution of the State, is certainly true. ' And I may be permitted to add, that no citizen of the State would more zealously
and'sincerely oppose any change in the fundamental policy of the
State in this regard, than I would myself, because of the liability
of the relation of master and slave to abuses, because of the demoralizing influences of those abuses upon society, and because of its
impoverishing consequences upon the prosperity and energies of the
community in which it exists. But the question under consideration is, not whether slavery shall be introduced into Ohio, bat
whether there shall be that observance of comity in the unrestricted
intercourse between Ohio and the people of an adjoining sister
State, which is -essential to harmony
regard for the spirit and true intent of
in contravention of the policy of Ohio,
they exist in Kentucky, arising out of

and reciprocity, and a due
the federal compact. Is it
to recognize legal rights as

the relation of master and
slave; or to recognize the actual status of a slave, as it in fact
exists by the laws of Kentucky, because the slave had been in Ohio,
although for a mere temporary purpose and without claiming his
freedom, had voluntarily returned to the service of his master in
Kentucky ? As I have already remarked, our constitutional prohibition is against slavery or involuntary servitude in Ohio. It
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does not operate in any respect or manner whatsoever, to prohibit
slavery in Kentucky. I give full scope to the onstitutional irhibition. No slavery or involuntary servitude, otherwise than for
crime, can ever be allowed in Ohio. When a citizen of Kentucky
brings, or sends his slave into Ohio, for temporary purposes, or in
itinere, he can not compel him to perform a single act of involuntary servitude, or hold him in subjection one moment in Ohio, for
the Purpose of the performance of involuntary service in this State.
But if a slave come into Ohio on an errand for his master, and voluntarily do the act, and return, this would not be involuntary ser.
vitude; nor would the slave, while in Ohio, be held in subjection for
involuntary service in this State. When Poindexter came within
the territory of Ohio, he might have lawfully refused to perform the
errand for his master, upon the ground, that his subjection to the
service of his master was in Kentucky, and could not exist in Ohio.
So also, if a citizen of Kentucky pass through Ohio on a journey
with his slave, he can not coerce the slave to acts of involuntary
servitude in this State, or hold him in subjection for the performance of such service in Ohio. And if, while sojourning in Ohio,
the slave voluntarily perform acts of, service for his master, this
would not be in violation of the constitutional provision.
The laws of the several States constantly protect the citizens of
the other States in their rights of property, when it is found within
their respective territories; and no one has ever doubted their
power to do so. And inasmuch as the legal right of property in
the service of the slave, in the States where slavery is authorized,
is recognized, not only by the laws of nations, but by our national
compact, which is the law of every State in the Union, this right
existing in a State where slavery is authorized, is entitled to protection in another State, where the slave may be, without fault on
the part of the master. Suppose a citizen of Kentucky with his
slave wrecked, and thrown by accident on the shores of this State.
The slave would not be a fugitive, and could not be arrested as
such. He would be under the protection of our law; yet it would
scarcely be claimed by any, that the master could not, according to
the laws which govern civilized nations in their intercourse with
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each other, be protected in his legal rights existing at the place of his
domicile. If a law had been enacted-absolutely prohibiting the ingress
and egress in this State of that class of persons, for any purpose, or in
any manner whatsoever, it might be different. But as it is, this contravenes no rule of law, of morality, or of public policy. The inscrutable doctrine that a slave, nolens volens, becomes absolutely and
forever free, the moment he touches the soil and breathes the air of
a country where slavery is prohibited, without a change of country
or domicile, is ideal, and. in contravention of the settled law relating
to the status of persons, and the law governing the international
intercourse of nations with each other. In Kentucky a man is not
allowed to rid himself of his obligation to support his slave, when,
from sickness or old age he becomes unprofitable; but, if this doctrine of absolute freedom by merely touching the soil of Ohio,
prevail, all that slaveholders in Kentucky have to do to rid themselves of all responsibility as to their unprofitable and useless slaves,
is to send them across the Ohio river on errands, and thus, they
may fill the poor-houses, and infirmaries, in the counties of this
State bordering on the Ohio river.
It is argued, however, that the moment a slave domiciled in
Kentucky, is allowed, by consent of his master, to step upon the
soil and breathe the atmosphere of Ohio, he becomes a free man,
and that, being once free, his status as a slave cannot re-attach to
him, even although he may return voluntarily and without delay to
the service of his master. There is nothing in the physical properties of either the soil or the atmosphere of Ohio, which can have
any such effect on the civil state and condition of the person. If
any such result follows when a slave comes within the territory of
Ohio, it is by the operation of law, and not that of the soil or the
atmosphere. And it will not be controverted, that if a slave by
permission of his master, remove from Kentucky to Ohio, with a
view of making this State the place of his home, from the time he
cmes within the territorial limits of this State, he becomes free;
and being thus once free by the laws of domicile which fixed his
8tatus, he does not afterwards become a slave by a return to Kentucky. And this is in accordance with the law of Keitucky, as
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settled in the case of .ankin vs. Lydia, 2 A. K. iMarshall's Rep.
468. The effect of this decision is nothing more than that Lydia
became free by a change of domicile, effected by a removal with her
master from Kentucky to the Territory of Indiana; and that the
prohibitory clause of the Ordinance of 1787, for the government of
the territory north-west of the Ohio river, applied to residents alone,
and not to sojourners or travellers. The rule, that a slave becomes
free upon his first landing in a State, or country, where slavery is
prohibited, applies only to cases of removal of residence and change
of domicile, and has no application whatever to cases of sojourners
or travellers. Otherwise it cannot be maintained, either upon principle or authority, and would contravene a well settled principle of
internationaljurisprudence. Iam aware, that the laws of France have
been referred to as at variance with this. But that arises upon a special
provision in an edict of Louis XIV., termed "Le Code Noir,"
expressly applicable to sojourners and travellers within the kingdom;
and also an edict of Louis XV., published in 1716, concerning
slavery in the Colonies, whereby, under a series of minute regulations, negro slaves were allowed to be brought to France, and continued in slavery, and compelled to return to their place of domicil,
under the direction of their masters; and wherein it was expressly
provided, that in case the owners should neglect a strict compliance
with the prescribed regulations, the negroes should become free,
and their owners lose their property therein. 20 How. St. Tr. 15,
note.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana have been
referred to as sustaining this special provision as to sojourners, in
the law of France, as a general principle of law. But with all
due deference, I must be allowed to say, that the Louisiana decisions do not go to any such extent.
The most that can be claimed from the case of Marie Louise vs.
Marot, 9 La. R. 475,is, that a temporary residence of a slave in a
free country, for an indefinite space of -time, by consent of the
owner, operated to free the slave. And in this case, it does not
appear that the intention to return existed at the time of the arrival
in Francd.
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Louis vs. Cabarrus,7 La. Rep. is simply to the effect, that a residence of a slave in a free State during two or three years, if with
the consent of the owner, works his freedom; but otherwise, if
without the consent of his master. This rests on the principle of
a change of domicile.
The case of Priscillavs. Smith, 13 La. Rep. 444, is placed by the
court on the same ground with 21farieLouise vs. Marot, and of Lurnsford vs. oquillon, both of which are cases of residence in a free
country by consent of the owner, and, although sent back, it does
not appear that the intention of returning existed, at the time of
going into the free country.
In P7rank vs. Powell, 11 La. Rep. 500, the slave had been
brought by his master to Ohio, and hired out to an inn-keeper, on
an understanding, that as soon as his wages should produce $150
to the person hiring him, he should be free. This was a change of*
domicile, by consent of the master. The court, in this case, noticoe
the case of Lumsford vs. Coquillon, 2 Martin, N. S. 501, as stand
ing on the same principle, which is, that "It is from the intentior,
of the owner to remove and reside with his slave, that the emancipation results immediately on such removal."
In the case of -lizabeth Thomas vs. Generis, 16 La. Rep. 486.
the slave had been taken by the owner to the State of Illinois, in.
November, 1833, where she resided, by the consent of the owner,
till February, 1837; and it does not appear whether the intention
of returning existed or not. The court, in this case, reviews its
former decisions on this question, including the case of J.farie Louise,
and places them all on the ground of a residence in a free State,
with the consent of the owner. None of the Louisiana cases go so
far as to hold, that if a slave be merely sent into a free State, on,
an errand, or be there in itinere, by the consent of the owner, thatit operates to produce his freedom.
In the case of the Com. vs. Aves, 18 Pick. 193, which was the
case of a temporary residence in Massachusetts, for some months,
of a person with a slave, from Louisiana, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, expressly waiving the question as to the effect of
the laws of that State on a slave passing through, or properly
7
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coming into the State on business, make the doctrine, that "a slave
brought voluntarily and unnecessarilywith the limits of the State,"
becomes free, to depend on the fact, whether the slave chooses to
avail himself of the provisions of the laws of that State.
The case of Com. vs. Taylor, 8 Met. 72, is substantially to
the same effcct.
In the case of Nancy Jackson vs. Bulloch, 12 Conn. Rep. 39, it
appeared that Nancy, who was born in the State of Georgia, in the
year 1813, and the slave of the defendant, according to the laws of
that State, was, in June, 1885, brought by the defendant, with his
family, into the State of Connecticut, for the purpose of a temporary residence, the master intending, at a future indefinite period,
to return with her and his family to the State of Georgia; that
:Nancy continued in his service, with his family, from June 1835,
.until June, 1837, the time of the issue of the writ; and that the
'defendant, in the meantime, returned to his residence in Georgia
twice, spending several months there, each time leaving Nancy with
,his family, in Connecticut. Under this state of facts, it was held,
'by a majority of the court (three judges against two,) that Nancy
became free, by the operation of the special provision of a statute
-of Connecticut, prohibiting the bringing of any negro or mulatto
slave into the State, "to be disposed oJ, left, or sold within the
,State."
This was the case of a temporary residence, for an indefinite
period; but the court place the decision on the ground, that the
case come within the express terms of a special statute. The right
of transit, however, through Connecticut, by a citizen of another
State, with his slave, is expressly admitted in the opinion of the
-court, in this case. And it is worthy of remark, here, that the
court, in this -case, was unanimous in the opinion, that the provision
-of the -constitution of that State, declaring that all men were
" equal in their rights, and that no man, or set of men, are entitled
to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community,"
had evident reference, solely and alone, to those who were parties
to the social compact formed or constituted by the Constitution; and
that slaves could not be said to be parties to that compact, or to be
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represented in it. And the following is added, in which it appears
the court was unanimous:
So, too, when, by another article in the Constitution, all colored persons are
excluded from the privileges of electors, it would seem as if all such persons were
considered as excluded from the social compact.
The 8th section of the bill of rights has also been pressed upon us, that "the
people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures." This is almost a transcript of the 4th article
of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States. And the fact that this
amendment was adopted at all, and that, amid all the conflict of opinions upon the
subject of slavery, this clause has never been claimed to affect that subject, shows
very strongly, that it was not intended to apply to that description of persons.
When the preamble to the Constitution of the United States speaks of "WE THE
PEOPLE, to secure the blessings. of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution," it cannot be seriously contended that it
included that class of people called slaves; and the term people, in the bill of
rights (in Connecticut,) must have been used in a similar sense. The 8th section
of the bill of rights, then, can not be intended to include slaves. Opinion of the
court, by Williams, Ch. J., 12 Conn. R. 43.

These decisions, in Massachusetts and Connecticut, referred to,
are to the effect onli/, that non-residents or transient persons can
not introduce negro slavery into those States, and maintain it there,
even temporarily. In neither of these cases is the right of transit
of a citizen of another State, with his slave, through Massachusetts
or Connecticut, denied; in neither of them is it pretended, that the
mere landing of a slave on the soil of one of those States, by the
consent of his master, effects, absolutely and forever, his emancipation, and that his voluntary return to servitude in the place of
his domicile would not leave his status as a slave without change.
On the contrary, the reasonings of the.courts, in those cases, distinctly concede the continuance of the status of a slave, in case of
voluntary return ; and also concede, that legal rights arising out of
the relation of master and slave, and existing in a State where
slavery is authorized, may be recognized and enforced in Massachusetts or Connecticut. The effect of these adjudications, therefore, is most clearly and distinctly against the position taken by
the majority of the court, in the case before us, which is nothing
more nor less than this, that the undeniable legal status of Poindexter, in Kentucky, the place both of his domicile and of the con-
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tract, can not be even recognized by the courts of Ohio, in a suit
upon the contract in this State. Because Poindexter came within
the territory of Ohio, and performed a single act of voluntary
service, although without claiming his freedom, he voluntarily returned, the same day, to his home, in Kentucky, he is declared by
a court in Ohio to have been actually a freeman in Kentucky, in
defiance of the constitution and laws of Kentucky. The question
is, not what Poindexter was while in Ohio, or what his condition
might have been, had he remained in this State, and claimed his
freedom. But the question is as to the mere recognition of his true
legal status in Kentucky at the time of the making of the contract.
And it is argued, that we can not even recognize the actual legal
status of Poindexter in Kentucky, undeniably the place of his
domicile, as well as the place of the contract, without abrogating a
part of the constitution of Ohio, in order to give the slave code of
Kentucky an operation within this State. Thus, under the fallacious idea of guarding against the operation of the laws of Kentucky within the territory of Ohio, actually making the constitution of Ohio operate in Kentucky, not only to regulate the lex
loci contractus within that State, but also to change the fixed
status of a person at the place of his domicile in that State. Such
an argument need but be stated, not answered.
It has been conceded, that a note given for the purchase of a
slave in Kentucky may be enforced in Ohio; but it is said, that
stands upon the ground that the lex loci contractus must govern in
matters of contract I inquire what is the ground of controversy in
the case before us but a contract-a subject matter of the lex loci
contractus P It is incontestable that the lex loci controls as to the
status of the parties to a contract, as well as its subject matter.
And in this case, the actual status of Poindexter in Kentucky
was, in fact, the subject matter of the contract itself.
With all due deference, I must be allowed to say, and I say it
without fear of contradiction, that no adjudicated case can be found,
either in the United States or in England, which sustains the position upon which the decision of this case is placed.
Great force is given to an express prohibition of slavery. It is
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said, that it "strikes down and destroys ;" and can not give way
to the local laws of another State. Now, a local law of another
State can have no extra territorial operation at all events ; and in
that respect, the prohibition can be of no effect. The prohibition
in our constitution absolutely prevents all slavery or involuntary
servitude within the territory of Ohio. But it does not operate
beyond the limits of this State. It cannot affect the condition of
the negro in Kentucky. It is operative on the condition and servitude of persons in Ohio. It is not a prohibition against the recognition of legal rights in another State. And it can have no operation whatever upon questions of comity, relating to matters
beyond the sphere of its operation.
It is also argued, as a matter supposed to be most conclusive and
unanswerable, that if a man can be a slave in Ohio for an hour or
a day, that he may be such for a month or a year, and that thus,
slavery may exist in this State in defiance of the constitution.
This argument is founded on the false assumption, that it is claimed
that slavery can exist in Ohio at all. I insist that a man cannot
be a slave in Ohio at all, that is, he can not be held to the performance of involuntary service in this State for one moment. If a
man, who is a slave in Kentucky, comes into Ohio, for a mere temporary purpose, intending to return, although not subject to involuntary service in Ohio, he still continues a slave in the State to
which he belongs. It is true, if he be allowed to change his domicile, and remove his home to Ohio, he becomes a free man. But if
his home be in Kentucky, and he be in Ohio, a mere traveller or
sojourner, he is not a slave in Ohio; because not subject to involuntary service here, but he is still a slave in Kentucky, because
he is legally liable to servitude there as soon as he returns. The
mere recognition in Ohio, of a legal right existing in Kent cky, is
not slavery in Ohio. And there is no law making it a forfeiture of
the legal right of the master, to permit his slave to come into this
State for a temporary purpose. The argument mentioned, therefore, is a baseless fabric, when the false assumption is exposed.
To maintain the ground, upon which the decision of this case is
based, it is essential that each one of the following distinct propositions be established:
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1st. That as soon as a slave, by the permission of his master,
enters the territory of a State or country where slavery is prohibited, even for a mere temporary purpose, or in transitu, intending
to return, he becomes absolutely and forever free.
2d. That if a slave thus go into a free State, without a change
of domicile, and thus become free, his immediate and voluntary
return to his domicile, without claiming his'freedom, can not reinstate his status as a slave ; and
3d. That after such return, although he may actually and in fact,
be a slave according to the laws of the place of his domicile, yet
that his true status as such, can not afterward be recognized in the
courts of Ohio, even in matters subject to the lex loci contractus.
It is asserted without qualification, that the law has been so well
settled in Ohio as never to have been questioned, that d slave
coming, at any time, by the consent of his master, even for a temyorary purpose, within the territory of Ohio, becomes at once, absolutely andforever free. This opinion must strike the greater part
of the legal profession, in this State, with surprise. How could
such a doctrine have been so well settled, and have prevailed
without question, against the repeated decisions of the courts in
adjoining States, and of the Supreme Court of the United States,
from time to time, to the contrary, in reference to slaves coming,
for terporary purposes, into Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. Until
recently, the right of transit of a master with his slave, in travelling through Ohio, was not questioned. In the intercourse of the
people of Ohio with the people of Kentucky and Virginia, since the
organization of the State government, it has been a very common
occurrence for a slave to be sent into this State on an errand, or to
pass through the State on a journey with his master; and the
acquiescence in this common practice most manifestly negatives the
prevalence of any such well settled and well known rule in Ohio,
as that mentioned. After the lapse of over a half a century, the case
before us is the first reported adjudication in Ohio, to announce and
give judicial sanction to a doctrine, on this subject, contrary to the
rule of law as settled in the other States, and by the repeated
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. But this
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case has the especial distinction of being the pioneer case, in the
Supreme Court of Ohio, in giving judicial sanction, not simply to
the idea, that the moment a slave, for a mere temporary purpose,
or in itinere, stepped upon the soil and breathed the atmosphere of
Ohio, be became free absolutelj and forever, but in promulgating a
doctrine never before judicially declared, either in this country or
in England, which is, that, although the slave coming on the soil of
Ohio, should choose not to claim his freedom, but to return voluntarily and without delay to the service of his master, at the place
of his domicile in another State, yet that nolens volens he was a
free man, by the magical operation of the constitution of Ohio
adhering to him, and following him to the place of his domicile, in
defiance of the constitution and laws of the State to which he
belongs.
In the case of Lewis vs. Fullerton, 1 Rand. 15, it was held by
the Court of Appeals in Virginia, that a slave going from Virginia
to Ohio, with the consent of his master, for a mere transitory purpose, and with the animus revertendi, does not thereby acquire a
right to freedom in Virginia; nor is such right established by a
judgment on a habeas corpus, in Ohio, in favor of the slave.
And in the case of Willard vs. The People, 4 Scam. 461, it was
held by the Supreme Court of Illinois, that a slave does not, by
the constitution of that State, which prohibits slavery, become free
by going into the State for the mere purpose of passing through it;
and that such going into the State is not an introduction of slavery
therein.
The doctrine of this last case is precisely in point, and directly
sustains my position; and that, too, in a State where there is an
express constitutional prohibition against slavery. If, however,
the absehice of all positive law to support the relation of master and
slave, annihilates it, and sets the slave free at once, I do not perceive how an express prohibition can do more.
There is a mistake in the assertion, that the authorities which I
have cited, come from States in which slavery is either authorized,
or not expressly forbidden. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
in the case of the negro Ayes, 18 Pick. say, that slavery was
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abolished in that State by their express constitutional provision,
declaring all men free: and the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in
the case of Jackson vs. Bullock, went on the ground of an expiess
statute excluding slavery, and certainly, the remark will not apply
to the case cited from Illinois.
It is also said, that MIr. Justice Story has said in his " Conflict
of Laws," that slavery will not be recognized in any country whose
institutions and policy prohibit slavery. This remark of Judge
Story is not sustained by authority, and is irreconcilable with the
decision of the case of the Antelope, 10 Wheat., in which he concurred ; and inconsistent with the doctrine of Ch. J. Shaw, in the
case of the negro Ayes, 18 Pick., which Judge Story has quoted at
full length and with approbation, in a note in a late edition of
his "Conflict of Laws."
The law as settled in England has been referred to with great
confidence, as authority to sustain the positions assumed in this
case. And the case of the negro James Sommerset, 20 Howell's St.
Trials, 80, has been cited as the leading case settling the laws of
that country in this respect.
That was the case of a negro brought before the Court of King's
Bench, on a writ of habeas corpus, in December, 1771. The
return showed that Sommerset had been a negro slave in Africa,
and as such, in the course of the trade carried on by his Majesty's
subjects, between Africa and his majesty's colonies of Virginia,
Jamaica, etc., in America, was brought to the colony of Virginia,
and there sold as a slave, under the authority of law, to Charles
Steuart, Esq., then an inhabitant of Virginia, and whose negro
slave and property he was still claimed to be; that said Steuart, in
November, 1769, came on business to England, bringing Sommerset with him to attend him as his servant, with an intention of
returning, taking the slave back with him to America as soon as
his affairs and business in England should be transacted; but that
his affairs and business in that kingdom were not yet transacted,
and that his intention to return to America still continued; that
said Sommerset had continued to attend and serve said Steuart in
England, from the time of his arrival in that kingdom, until Octo-
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ber, 1771 (a period of about two years), when he departed from his
service, and refused to return to serve him longer; whereupon said
Steuart, on the 26th day of November, 1771, delivered Sommerset
confined in irons, to John Knowles, on board a ship called the Ann
and Mary, lying in the Thames, and bound for J'amaica (whose
master and commander said Knowles was), to be by him kept and
conveyed in said ship, on its then voyage to Jamaica, for the purpose of being there sold as the slave and property of said Steuart.
Several things are to be especially noted in regard to this case:
1st. That the writ of habeas corpus was directed, not to Steuart
who claimed to own the slave, but to Captain Knowles, who held
the negro in close confinement, for the purpose of taking him abroad
to Jamaicato be sold as a slave in that country; that the case was
decided on the special circumstances set up in the return of Knowles
to the writ; and that the direct question involved was, not whether
the negro could be compelled to serve Steuart in England, or
whether Steuart could coerce him to go back to Virginia, his place
of domicile before he came to England, but whether Knowles could
legally hold him under Steuart's authority, for the purpose of
taking hun abroad to another country, there to be sold as a slave.
2d. Lord Mansfield, in deciding the case on the special circumstances set out in the return, said, " The only question before us is,
whether the cause on the return is sujfficient ? If it is, the negro
must be remanded; if it is not, he must be discharged. Accordingly, the return states, that the slave departed and refused to
serve; whereupon he was kept to be sold abroad. So high an act
of dominion must be recognized by the law of the country where it is
used," etc. And after some general romarks, touching the diversity in the powers of the master over his slave in different countries; and as to the odious character of slavery being such, that it
can only be supported by positive law, Lord Mansfield adds, "Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I can
not say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and
therefore, the black must be discharged."
3d. It is not to be overlooked, that Steuart was staying in England for an indefinite period ef time, and although he had been
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there for about two years before the negro refused longer to serve
him, yet it was still uncertain how much longer he was about to
remain; and also, that he was not proposing to send the negro back
to Virginia as his place of domicile, but to send him abroad to
another country, Jamaica, to be sold. The intention of returning
the negro to Virginia having been finally abandoned, here was a
clear case of absolute change of domicile. Lord Mansfield is erroneously reported as saying, that Steuart had purchased the negro
in Jamaica. It was in Virginia where Steuart had previously resided and where he had purchased the negro, as appears from the
return to the writ, and Mr. Hargrave's statement of the case in his
argument.
4th. After the argument of the case, Lord Mansfield expresses
some hesitation in the decision of the case; suggests a compromise;
and also an application to Parliament as "the best, and perhaps,
the only method of settling the pointfor the future;" states that
the question is, whether "the owner had a right to detain the slave,
for the sending him over to be sold in Jamaica;" and again, that
the now question is, whether the same dominion, authority, or coercion can be exercised in England over a slave which is authorized
by the American laws; remarks, that, "contract for the sale of a
slave is good in E-ngland," etc., but that, in this case, "the person
of the slave himself is the object of inquiry ;" and finally, adjourns
the case over till the next term for decision.
5th. In deciding the case finally, on the special ground, whether
the dominion could be exercised over the slave, to send him abroad
to be sold, he is particular to qualify the decision by saying, "We
pay all due attention to the opinion of Sir Philip Yorke, and Lord
Chancellor Talbot, whereby they pledged themselves to the British
planters, for all the legal consequences of slaves coming over to
this kingdom, or being baptized, recognized by Lord flardwicke,
sitting as Chancellor, on the 19th of October, 1749, that trover
would lie; that a notion had prevailed, if a negro came over, or
became a Christian, he was emancipated, but no ground in law;
that he and Lord Talbot, when Attorney and Solicitor General,
were of opinion, that no such claim for freedom was valid," etc.;
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and that, he did not conceive, but that a man might still become a
"villein in gross," etc.
That some errors have prevailed in regard to the true legal effect
of the opinion of Lord Mansfield in this case, is most manifest. He
used no such expression, as that a slave became free the moment he
landed in England; it is true, he said, that slavery was odious, and
could only be supported by "positive law." But what was meant
by positive law has not always been accurately understood. Mi'.
Curtis (now Mr. Justice Curtis of the Supreme Court of the U. S.),
in his argument of the case of Ayes, 18 Pick. 199, said, "If by
positive law is meant a law enacted by the legislative power of the
country, the assertion is not true, in point of fact; for in all modern
States, with the exception of some of the colonies of Spain, slavery
has been introduced by custom, and without any action of the legislative power; and Chief Justice Shaw, in the same case, on page
212, adds, "that by positive law, in this connection, may be as well
understood customary law as the enactment of a statute; and the
word is used to designate rules established by tacit acquiescence, or
by the legislative act of a State, and which derive their force and
authority from such acquiescence or enactment, and not because
they are the dictates of natural justice, and as such, of universal
obligation."
It is true, the general remarks of Lord Mansfield are against the
legal existence of negro slavery in England. But it is here to be
particularly noticed, that the questions, how far legal rights arising
out of the relation of master and slave in the colonies would be
recognized and enforced in regard to persons domiciled in the colonies, and merely sojourning in England,. and whether the status of
a slave, after a sojourn in England, was reinstated by his return to
his domicile in the colonies, do not appear to have been particularly
considered in the Sommerset case, and Lord Mansfield expresses no
definite opinion upon either, except so far as may be gathered from
his opinion, that contracts made in England, for the sale of negro
slaves, would be obligatory, and that he recognized the law as expressed by Lord Chancellor Talbot and Lord Hardwicke, in regard
to slaves coming over to the kingdom from the colonies and becom-
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ing baptized, and that a man might still occupy the condition of a
villein in gross in England.
While it is to be regretted that the report of Lord Mansfield's
opinion had not been more full and explicit, it is very certain there
is nothing in it which sustains the doctrine upon which the decision
of the case before us is placed.
The high authority of Sir William Blackstone has been appealed
to, whose commentaries were, before publication, submitted to the
supervision of Lord M-Iansfield, at a period not distant from the time
of the decision in the Sommerset case. But the authority of this
standard commentator, fully considered, utterly fails to support the
positioi assumed in this case. While he recognizes the law of
domicile in England, in language similar to that of Lord Mansfield
in the Sommerset case, he expressly recognizes the right of the
master to thec service of his slave, even under the laws of England,
while the relation of master and servant continues, in the following
language:
It is laid down that a slave or negro, the instant he lands in England, becomes a
freeman; that is, the law will protect him in the enjoyment of his person and his
property. Yet, with regardto any right which the master ?ayg have lawfully acquired
to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain in exactly the same state as
before; for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life which every
apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a longer term.
Hence, too, it follows, that the infamous and unchristian practice of withholding
baptism from negro servants, lest they should thereby gain their liberty, is totally
without foundation, as well as without excuse. The law of England acts upon general and extensive principles; it gives liberty, rightly understood, that is, protection, to
a Jew, a Turk, or a heathen, as well as to those who profess the true religion of
Christ; and it will not dissolve a civil obligation between master and servant, on
account of the alteration of faith in either of the parties, but the slave is entitled to
the same protection in England before, as after baptism ; and whatever service the
heathen negro owed of right to his American master by general, not by local law,
the same (whatever it be) is he bound to render when brought to England and made
a Christian. 1 Wend. Blackstone, 424.

The right of the master to the services of his slave even in England, so distinctly stated here by Blackstone, is consistent with the
language of qualification used by Lord Mansfield in his opinion in
the Sommerset case.
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Blackstone explains what is meant by the often repeated expression, "that slavery cannot subsist in England; and that "the
instant a slave or negro lands in England he becomes a freeman." He says, on page 423, (Wend.'s Bl. vol. 1,) "I have formerly observed that pure and proper slavery does not, nay, cannot subsist in England; such, 1 mean, whereby an absolute and
unlimited power is given to the master over the life and fortune of
the slave." And on page 424 he adds: "And now it is laid down
that a slave or negro, the instant be lands in England, becomes a
freeman; that is, the law will protect him in the enjoyment of his
person and his property. Yet, with regard to any right which the
master may have lawfully acquired to the perpetual service of the
negro, this will remain in exactly the same state as before," etc.
"And whatever service the heathen negro owed of right to his
American master by general, not by local law, the same (whatever
it be) is he bound to render when brought to England and made a
Christian."
It is manifest that the slavery which was repudiated in England,
was that form of it which conceded to the master absolute and
unlimited power over the person and life of the slave; and other
odious incidents to the power of the master, supported only by local
law, and understood at that age to be peculiar to negro slavery.
This is what Blackstone termed "pure and proper slavery." And
the instant a negro landed in England the law protected him in his
person, and he became freed from any inhuman dominion over his
life or person; but still he might be held to "perpetual service,"
under the relation of master and servant, as it was recognized in
England. Slavery in some countries gives the master absolute control over the life and person of the slave. This was understood to
be the case with slavery in Africa, and to some extent to be incident to negro slavery in the American colonies in 1771. Lord
Mansfield, in the Sommerset case, in reference to slavery " according to the American laws," speaks of "the difficulty of adopting the
relation without adopting it in all it consequences," many of which
were "contrary to the municipal law of England." Yet, in deciding the Sommerset case on the special circumstances stated in the
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return to the writ, he recognizes the doctrine of Talbot and Hardwicke as to negro slavery, and adds in connection therewith, "that
though the statute of tenures bad abolished villeins regardant to a
manor, yet he did not conceive but that a man might still become a
villein in gross," etc. Now, villeinage in gross as it existed in
England, did not differ very essentially, in its legal incidents, from
negro slavery as it exists in Kentucky. Although the master had
no power over the life of the villein, or right to maim, or to use
brutal violence upon his person, yet he had absolute control over his
person for the purpose of his services for life, and this extended to
his issue; and the villein was saleable and transmissible from one
master to another. Villeins regardant were chattels real, and were
sold with the land. But villeins in gross were transferable as
simple chattels.
In the case of Smith v. Brown et al., 2 Salk. 667, which was an
indebitatus assumpsit for the price of a negro sold by plaintiff to
defendant, "Holt, C. J., held, that as soon as a negro comes into
England he becomes free. One may be villein in .England, but not
a slave." And Powell, J., added: "In a villein the owner has a
property, but it is an inheritance." In a word, he has a property,
but it is a chattel real; the law took no notice of a negro."
It is manifest, from the language of Lord Chief Justice Holt, as
well as that of Blackstone and others, that the servitude of villeins
in gross, and that kind of perpetual servitude which did not give
the master absolute dominion over the life and person of the servant, was not slavery in their understanding of the term; and that
the slavery which they said could not subsist in England, was that
which Blackstone terms "pure and proper slavery."
The case of Butts vs. Perry, decided in 28 Charles I., 2 Lev.
201, and 3 Keb. 785, was trover for ten negroes, in which it was
held, that negroes being usually bought and sold among merchants
in India, and being infidels, there might be a property in them
sufficient to sustain the action.
In Jelly vs, Clive, which was trover for a negro and certain articles of merchandise, decided in 5 Win. & Mary, 1 Ld. Raym. 147,
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it was held that trover would lie for a negro, because negroes
are heathen.
In the case of Pearnevs. Lisle, decided in 1749, 1 Ambler, 75,
Lord Hardwicke, holding that trover would lie for a negro slave,
said:
I have no doubt, but trover will lie for a negro slave; it is as much property as
any other thing. The case in Salk. 666, was determined on a want of proper description. It was troverpro uno .iEthiope vocat. ffegro without saying slave; and
the being negro did not necessarily imply slave. The reason said at the bar to
have been given by Lord Chief Justice Holt, in that case, as the cause of his
doubts, viz: That the moment a slave sets foot in England he becomes free, has no
weight with it, nor can any reason be found, why they should not be equally so
when they set foot in Jamaica,or any other English plantation. All our Colonies
are subject to the laws of England, although as to some purposes, they have laws
of their own. There was once a doubt, whether, if they were christened, they
would not become free by that act, and there were precautions taken in the Colonies to prevent their being baptized, till the opinion of Lord Talbot, and myself,
then Attorney and Solicitor General, was taken on that point. We were both of
opinion, that it did not at all alter their state."

I do not understand Lord Mansfield, in the Sommerset case, to
attempt to review and overrule prior adjudications. On the contrary, he recognizes the doctrine of Talbot and Hardwicke, and
justifies it by the existing authority for villeinage in gross. And
it is idle to attempt to explain the right of the master to "the perpetual servitude" of the slave, as recognized by Blackstone, on the
ground of contract. It is argued, that the position of Blackstone
was overruled by the decision of the Sommerset case. This can
not be so, for there is no actual inconsistency in views expressed by
Blackstone and Lord Mansfield's opinion. Had the Sommerset
case been understood as overruling Blackstone's position, a correction would doubtless have been made in the very next edition of
the Commentaries. It is said that my view of the Sommerset case
is new. This may be so to those who have not fully examined the
case. I let the report of the case speak for itself; and for this
purpose, special attention is called to the opinion of Lord Mansfield, and the return to the habeas corpus given in full. 20
Howell's St. Trials, 1. It is said that the Ordinance of 1787, for
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the government of the North Western Territory; and the constitution of Ohio, of 1802, were framed with a view to the decision of
the Sommerset case, and in accordance therewith. This, I most
respectfully controvert. The prohibitory clauses, in these instruments, stand upon altogether higher ground. They did not leave
authority to buy and sell, or traffic in slaves in Ohio, which Lord
Mansfield expressly recognized by conceding the validity of such
contracts made in England ; and they did not recognize or sanction
slavery, in the modified form of villeinage in gross.
I have examined at some length, these English aathorities, not
for the purpose of sustaining my own position, but for the purpose
of correcting some misapprehensions, and showing that they do not
sustain the position taken by the majority of the court, as had been
supposed.
In the celebrated case of the slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. R. 94,
Lord Stowell holding, that upon the return of a slave to his original
domicile, from a country by whose laws he was declared free, the
state of slavery would re-attach to him, said: "The entire change
of the legal character of individuals, produced by the change of
local situation, is far from being a novelty in the law. A residence
in a new country often introduces a change of legal condition,
which imposes rights and obligations totally inconsistent with the
former rights and obligations of the same persons. Persons bound
by particular contracts, which restrain their liberty,-debtors, apprentices and others, lose their character and condition for the
time, when they reside in another country, and are entitled, as
persons totally free, although they return to their original servitude
and obligations, upon their coming back to the country they had
quitted; and even in the case of slavery, slaves themselves possess
rights and privileges in one character, which they are not entitled
to in another. The domestic slave may, in that character, by law,
accompany his master or mistress to any part of the world. But
that privilege exists no longer than his character of domestic slave
attaches to him ; for, should the owner deprive him of the character
of being a domestic slave, by employing him as a field slave, he
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would be deprived of the right of accompanying his master out of
the colony."
It appears that after the decision of this case, Lord Stowell
wrote to Judge Story, inclosing to him a copy of his opinion in the
case; and that Story, in his reply, of the date of 22d Sept., 1828,
said :
If I had been called upon to pronounce a judgment in a like case, I should certainly have arrived at the same result, though I might not have been able to present the reasons which lead to it in such a striking and convincing manner. It
appears to me that the opinion is impregnable.
In my native State (AMassachusetts), the state of slavery is not recognized as
legal; yet, if a slave should come hither, and afterward return to his own home, we
should certainly think that the local laws would re-attach upon him, and that his servile
character would be re-integrated. I have had occasion to know that your judgment
has been extensively read in America (where questions of this nature are not of
unfrequent discussion), and Inever have heard any other opinion but that of approbation of it expressed among theprofession of the law.
Life and Letters of Story, 1 vol., 558.

After speaking of the question of a slave becoming free, on his
removal to a country where slavery is not allowed, Judge Story, in
his work on Conflict of Laws, says, Sec. 96: "It is quite a different question, how far rights acquired, and wrongs done slave property, or contracts made respecting *such property, in countries
where slavery is permitted, may be allowed to be redressed, or
recognized in the judicial tribunals of governments, which prohibit
slavery."
The case of .adrazo vs. Wiles, decided in 1820, and reported
in 5 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 313, was an action brought by a subject
of Spain against a British subject, who had unlawfully captured a
ship with three hundred slaves on board. A question having been
raised at the trial before the Lord Chief Justice, whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the slaves in an English
court of justice, since the slave trade, and all dealings connected
with it, had been declared, by the British statutes, unlawful, and
contrary to the principles of justice, humanity and sound policy,
the jury was directed to find their verdict separately for each part
of the damage, so as to give the defendant an opportunity of test-
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ing his question, by motion after verdict. Accordingly, the jury
found for the plaintiff, assessing his damages at 21,1801.; consisting of 3,0001. for deterioration of ship's stores and goods, and
18,1801. for the supposed profit of the cargo of slaves. On motion
to reduce the damages to the extent of the assessment for the
cargo of slaves, the court, by a unanimous decision, held, that as
the slave trade was not condemned by the general law of nations, a
foreigner, who is not prohibited from carrying on the slave trade
by the laws of his own country, may, in a British court of justice,
recover damages sustained by him in respect of the wrongful seizure, by a British subject, of a cargo of slaves on board of a ship
then employed by him in carrying on the African slave trade.
It has been said, that the case of .orbes vs. Cochrane, 2 Barn.
& Cressw. 448, is in conflict with the case last cited, and to the
.effect, that whenever a slave, in any manner, gets beyond the limits
where the local law authorizing his servitude operates, he becomes
free. But whatever may have been the obiter dicta of the judges
in this case, it decided nothing more than that an action would not
.lie against the master of a ship for harboringslaves who had escaped
from their master in Florida and got on board the ship, the owner
being allowed to use persuasive, but not coercive means, to take the
slaves off the ship.
The case of Tlie Diana, 1 Dodson, 95, sustains the general
principles, that, although the slave-trade is condemned in the English
courts, as contrary to the principles of justice and humanity, yet as'
it cannot, with truth, be said to be contrary to international law,
courts must respect the property of persons engaged in it, under
the sanction of the laws of their own country. To the same effect
are the cases of Le Louis, 2 Dodson, 236; and The Amedie, 1
Acton, 240.
The same doctrine is declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the able opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of
the Antelope, 10 Wheat. 120, the effect of which is, that although
slavery and the slave-trade are deemed contrary to natural right,
yet it is settled by the judicial decisions both of this country and
of England, that they are not contrary to the laws of nations.
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The result of this doctrine is, that, each independent community,
in its intercourse with every other, is bound to act on the principle,
that such other country has complete authority to make such laws
for the government of its own subjects, as its own judgment shall
dictate, provided the same be consistent with the laws of nations;
and that each sovereign State, although governed by its own laws,
and competent to make such laws as it may deem expedient for
the government of its own subjects, has no authority to enforce
its own laws beyond its own territorial limits, or over those who
are not its subjects, or to treat the laws of other States, or rights
acquired under the laws of other States, not consistent with
the laws of nations, as void, although contrary to its own views of
morality.
The following remarks of Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the
opinion of the court, in the case of Com. vs. Ayes, 18 Pick, above
cited, are in point, and fully sustain my position.
"Upon a general review of the authorities, and upon an application of the well
established principles upon this subject, we think they fully maintain the point
stated, that, though slavery is contrary to natural right, to the principles ofjustice,
humanity and sound policy, as we adopt them, and found our laws upon them, yet,
not being contrary to the law of nations, if any other State or community see fit to
establish and continue slavery bylaw, so far as the legislative power of the country
extends, we are bound to take notice of the eristence of those laws, and we are not at
liberty to declare, and hold an act done within those limits, unlawful and void upon
our views of morality andpoZicy, which the sovereign and leyislative power of theplace
has pronounced to be lawful
If, therefore, an unwarranted interference and wrong is done by our citizens to a
foreigner, acting under the sanction of such laws, and within their proper limits,
that is, within the local limits of the power by whom they are thus establised, or
on the high seas, which each and every nation has a right in common with all
others to occupy, our laws would no doubt afford a remedy against the wrong done.
So in pursuance of a well known maxim, that in the construction of contracts, the
lez loci contractus shall govern, if a person, having in other respects a right to sue
in our courts, shall bring an action against another, liable in other respects to be
sued in our courts, upon a contract made upon the subject of slavery, in a State
where slavery is allowed by law, the law here would give it effect. As if a note of
hand, made in New Orleans, were sued on here, and the defense should be, that it
was on a bad consideration, or without consideration, because given for the price of
a slave sold, it may well be admitted that such a defense ceuld not prevail, because
the contract was a legal oxie by the law of the place where it was made."
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Negro slavery has been spoken of, in this case, repeatedly, as
property in human beings,-as creating a relation assimilated to the
relation of the owner to his domestic animals, etc. What is meant
byproperty in men, so often repeated? Does it mean a property
in the flesh and blood of the slave ? Does it mean that a master,
in Kentucky, has dominion over the life of his slave, and may kill
him and eat him, as he does his ox? Does it mean that a master
has a right to treat his slave with brutal violence ? If so, it is what
is termed ad caytandum logic, and is without foundation in fact.
The property of the master in his slave in Kentucky consists in the
right of the former to the services of the latter, and control over
him for that purpose only, and not a property in his flesh and
blood. The laws of Kentucky recognize the negro slave as a man,
and protect his person as a human being, while they hold him to be
property as to the service of his master. While the relation of
employer and employed produces a qualified property of the former
in the services of the latter by contract, the relation of master and
slave produces a property in the services of the latter by operation
of law.
This is not the place to discuss the comparative advantages and
evils incident to these two different systems of labor. Suffice it to
say, that however great may be the evils of domestic slavery, the
system of labor by voluntary contract is not without its consequent
oppressions and sufferings. The scenes of distress from destitution,
and mortality from hunger, and want of sufficient clothing and shelter from the inclemencies of the season, to be witnessed among the
operatives in the work-shops and factories of England, while they
may attest the fact, that free labor is cheaper than slave labor to
the employer, show that the former is not without its attendant
train of human suffering and distress.
I have taken a much wider range in the consideration of the
questions brought under the review in this case, than I should have
otherwise done, on account of their frequent occurrence and important bearing upon the harmony and welfare of the country. The
real question, however, under discussion must be determined by the
laws of Kentucky. Poindexter was not only in Kentucky, but
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domiciled in Kent'ucky, at the time the notes were given. And the
question is, not whether the laws of Kentucky can operate in Ohio;
not whether Poindexter would have been a freeman had he been in
Ohio; but whether he was at the time, a slave in Kentuky. The
judicial tribunals of Ohio can not stand on punctilio, and refuse to
recognize an existing legal fact necessarily brought to their consideration. And whether Poindexter was a slave or not depended
on the effect of the law of Kentucky, within the limits of that State.
And to ascertain what the law of Kentucky was in this respect, we
are not under the necessity of looking to the laws of England, or of
any other state or country; for it has been fully determined, and
explicitly declared, by the judicial tribunals of that State.
In Collins vs. America, 9 B. Monroe, 565, it was decided, that
a slave in Kentucky, sent or permitted to go into Ohio for a temporary Turpose, where slavery is prohibited, does not thereby acquire
a right to assert his freedom in Kentucky; and that on his return
from Ohio to the custody of his owner, he could not appeal to the
laws of that State for his freedom.
In Maria vs. Kirby, 12 B. Monroe, 512, it was held, that,
"though a State may have a right to declare the condition of every
person within her limits, the right only exists while that person remains
there. She has not the power of giving a condition or status to a
person temporarily within her limits which will adhere to the person
every where-but upon the return of the person to the place of his
domicile, he will occupy his former position; if a slave, that of a
slave. And that in case of the removal of a slave into a free State
temporarily, who returns with or to his owner, the effect upon the
status of the slave is to be determined by the law of Kentucky, and
not that of the State where the slave had been."
I do not understand the courts of Kentucky, as has been intimated,
to refuse to recognize the laws of Ohio, as fixing the status of persons domiciled in this State. The decision in the case of. lankin
vs. Lydia, heretofore cited, shows the contrary. Where, however,
a subject of the State of Kentucky comes into Ohio for a mere
temporary purpose, they do not recognize that as a change of domicile, or as affecting a change in the status of the persin. And this
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appears to be in accordance with well-settled principles. And with
all proper deference, I must be permitted to say, that I cannot perceive how it can be fairly said, that we must abrogate a part of the
Constitution of Ohio, and introduce the slave code of Kentucky
here, in order to recognize the laws of Kentucky as governing the
status of a person actually domiciled, both by birth and by choice,
in that State. And I have not been able to find the report of a
case decided, either in England or in this country, where it has
been held, that the status of a person was not to be regarded as
being fixed by the laws of the place of his domicile.
Graham vs. S'trader et al. 5 B. Monroe, 173, is a case decided
by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, in 1844, wherein it was held,
that the owner of a slave residing in Kentucky does not forfeit his
slave by taking him into Indiana or Ohio himself, or permitting
another to do so, where the object of the visit is only temoraryfor a few hours of pleasure or amusement, or travelling -through the
State, and especially where no right to freedom is asserted by the
slave while there.
This casewas taken to the Supreme Court of the United States,
where it was held, "that the laws of Kentucky alone could decide
upon the domestic and social condition of the persons domiciled within
its territory, except so far as the powers of the States in this respect
are restraihed, or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the
Constitution of the United States, and that the decision of the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky, in this case, was conclusive". See Strader
vs. Graham, 10 How. 83.
These adjudications in Kentucky, sanctioned by that of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Stradervs. Graham,are in
strict accordance with the law as it has been settled in Missouri,
and a number of the other States; in accordance with the law as
settled in England, as appears from the cases heretofore cited; in
accordance with the rule recognized by Judge Story in his letter to
Lord Stowell; and in accordance with the doctrine settled by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the recent elaborately
investigated case of Dred Scott vs. Sandford, 19 How. Rep. 396,
which has attracted much attention. There is no mistaking and no
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mode of avoiding the force of the authority of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States on this question. I refer to
them, not as the decisions of a tribunal exercising appellate power
over our judgments, but as the adjudications of a tribunal entitled
to the very highest consideration and respect, and more especially
on such a question as that before us. The suit pending here might
have been instituted in the federal courts. And if the Supreme
Court of the United States can constitutionally exercise appellate
power over the State courts, in any case, it would be in cases between
citizens of different States, and in regard to questions involving the
peace and harmony of the several States, in their intercourse with
each other.
At the present term, this court, by a majority opinion, has recognized the binding authority of the adjudications of the Supreme
Court of the United States, even to reverse our own judgments,
and that, too, on a simple question of local State taxation, a question in no wise connected with the affairs of the federal government,
or of the other States of the Union ; the effect of which adjudication,
if authoritative, was not only to nullify a State revenue law, but also
to abrogate a most salutary and important provision in the Constitution of this State, requiring an equal burden of taxation to be
imposed on the moneyed institutions of the State. (See Piqua

Bank vs. Knoup, Ohio Rep. And I must be allowed to say, with all
due deference for the opinion of the majority of this court, if in this
matter of equal taxation in Ohio, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States can have the binding force and .effect of
law to us, paramount not only to the statutes, but the Constitution

of the State, I am wholly unable to perceive upon what legal ground
the decision of that tribunal, upon a question such as that now before
us, should not govern us in our judicial action.
It is argued, however, that negro slavery is immoral and criminal
in itself, and in contravention of law, both natural and divine; and
that, therefore, its legal existence in Kentucky, or rights arising
out of it there, are not to be recognized or enforced in this State.
It is not necessary for the purposes of this opinion, to consider
the question whether slavery is contrary to the law of nature. That
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has been a controverted question among casuists and writers on
natural law. Aristotle, Grotius," Hobbs, Puffendorff, Bynkershock,
Rutherford, Paley and others, treat it as a usual condition which
may exist under regulations of the municipal law; and although
not the natural state of man, yet that it may be introduced consistently with the law of nature. On the other hand, Montesquieu,
Locke, Beattie, Blackstone, and other eminent writers, in reference
more especially to the relation of master and servant, "whereby an
absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life
and fortune of the slave," condemn slavery as repugnant to reason
and the principles of natural law. But, however much I may be
disposed to yield to the conclusive force of the views of the latter
over the former, it is wholly immaterial as it regards the determination of this case.
And it is equally unnecessary, here, to consider the question,
whether slavery is contrary to the divine law. We do not sit here
to administer the divine law. The only theocracy known on the
earth, was that which was governed by the law given on Mount
Sinai, whereby not only was slavery recognized, and regulated; but
the terms prescribed on which a slave, when freed on the day of
Jubilee, might be legally reinstated in his condition of servitude,
together with his wife and children, and required, thereafter, to
serve his master forever. Exodus, oh. 21, v. 4, 5 and 6. It is not
necessary to stop to inquire whether the law delivered to Moses on
Sinai, either sanctioned or established a relation contrary to the law
of nature, and intrinsically immoral and vicious. It is not necessary here, to inquire whether the repeated teachings of the New
Testament, of obedience of servants to their masters (Titus, ch. ii.,
v. 9; 1 Ep. of Peter, ch. ii., v. 18; 1 Timothy, ch. vi., Colossians,
ch. iii., v. 22; Ephesians, ch. 6, v. 5); or whether the act of Paul,
in sending the fugitive slave Onesimus back to his master Philemon,
was giving a sanction to, and sustaining an institution sinful and
immoral in itself (Paul's Ep. to Philemon). It is not necessary to
inquire, whether there is a purer and higher morality than the Bible.
'These are questions for the theologian and the moralist, and upon
which I deem it proper to express no opinion whatever here. It is
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sufficient to know, that in the judicial determination of a question,
there is no higher law to us than the constitution which we have
sworn to support. We are not here to determine questions of
divinity or of casuistry. In determining how far we may disregard
the comity of nations, and refuse to recognize or enforce rights
arising out of a legal relation in another State, we must look to the
legal standard of morality, instead of the conflicting theories of
theologians and moralists. It is sufficient for us to know, that the
relation of master and slave is recognized by the constitution of the
United States, and sanctioned by the law of nations. This fixes
the legal standard of morality for judicial action on such a question
as this. When a similar question was presented to the Court of
Admiralty in England, in reference to the slave-trade, in the case
of Mke Louis, a French vessel captured on a slaving voyage, the
eminent English jurist, Sir William Scott, said: "A court, in the
administration of law, cannot impute criminality to an act where
the law imputes none. It must look to the legal standard of
morality; and, upon a question of this nature, that standard must
be found in the law of nations, as fixed and evidenced by general,
and ancient, and admitted practice, by treaties, and by the general
tenor of the laws and ordinances, and the formal transactions of
civilized States ; and looking to those authorities, he found a difficulty in maintaining that the transaction was legally criminal."
2 Dodson, 238. And the remarks of Chief Justice Marshall, in
reference to the same question in regard to the slave-trade, in the
-case of the Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, are in point: "Whatever
might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a jurist must
search for its solution in those principles of action which are sanctioned by the usages, the national acts, and the general assent of
that portion of the world of -which he considers himself as a part,
and to whose law the appeal is made. If we resort to this standard
as the test of international law, the question, as has already been
observed, is decided in favor of the legality of the trade. Both
Europe and America had embarked in it; and for nearly t'wo centuries it was carried on without opposition and without censure. A
jurist could not say, that a practice thus supported was illegal and
criminal."
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If, in regard, to the slave-trade, which was prohibited by a law
of Congress, and declared piracy on the part of a subject of our
own country, the courts of the United States were required to regard
the laws of other countries which had not prohibited it, and to recognize and protect the rights of the subjects of such other countries
arising out of the slave-trade; upon what legal principle can a State
of the American Union set at naught the law of comity between
States, and refuse to recognize .or enforce legal rights, because they
have their origin, not in the slave-trade abroad which has been condemned by a law of Congress, and made criminal in a citizen of the
United States, but in the relation of master and slave within the
territory and under the laws of a sister State. Moralists and
philanthropists may be indulged in their appeals to public sentiment
in behalf of their schemes of moral reform; but courts of justice
have no authority to change the legal standard of morality between
States, and pronounce that to be immoral and criminal in the laws
of another State, which has existed, in different forms, in all ages
of the world, which is tolerated by the law of nations, which existed
to some extent in every State of our confederacy at the time of
the formation of the Union, and which is distinctly recognized by
the Constitution of the United States, which we are bound by our
judicial oath to support. It is the duty of the judicial tribunals to
declare the law as it is, not to change it. In our judicial action we
can recognize no higher law than the law of the land. And I may
add, that if the time shall come, when our judicial tribunals shall
yield to the clamor of popular excitement, and announce a higher
law than the constitution, and statutes framed under it, they will
proclaim anarchy and organize insurrection.
NOTE BY THE REPoTE.- The Chief Justice directs it to be noted, that he had
copied, and directed to be appended to his opinion, in a note, the statement of
the case, copy of the Return to the writ of habeas corpus, and opinion of Lord Mansfield in full, both at the adjournment, and on the final decision, in the case of Sommerset, as reported in 20 Howell's St. Trials 1-82; but, that after his doing so, Judge
Swan concluded to embody the same matter, in full, in the body of his opinion:
And that this accounts for the omission of the matter, in a note here, to which
the Chief Justice refers, in Ohio St. R., at page 714, but which will be oouud in
Judge Swan's opinion, in this case, at page lb. 675.

THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine.
RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE OF PERSONS OF AFRICAN DESCENT.

Free colored persons, of African descent, having a residence established in
some town in this State, for the term of three months next preceding any election,
are authorized under the provisions of the Constitution of Maine, to be electors for

Governor, Senators and Representatives-they being otherwise qualified according
to law.

The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court' respectfully present
their opinion in answer to the interrogatory addressed to them by
2
the order of the Senate under date of March 26, 1857.
The interrogatory, as propounded, is very comprehensive in its
terms, and includes "free colored persons of African descent,
having a residence established in some town in this State, for the
term of three months next preceding any election," &c., whether
such persons are men, women, children, paupers, persons under
guardianship, or unnaturalized foreigners.
Presuming it to have been the intention of the Senate to confine
the inquiry to free colored male persons of African descent, who
are twenty-one years of age and upwards, and who are possessed of
the other qualifications requisite to constitute a white citizen a voter,
we will proceed to answer.
Art. ii, § 1, of the constitution of Maine, provides that
"Every male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and
upwards, excepting paupers, persons under guardianship, and Indians not taxed,
having his residence established in this State for the term of three months next preceding any election, shall be an elector for Governor, Senators and Representatives
in the town or plantation where his residence is so established."

This raises for our consideration the distinct question, whether
free native born colored persons, of African descent, are recognized
as "citizens of the United States," in the above provision of the
constitution.
The political status of that portion of the African race in this
country, which is not in a state of slavery, has long been matter of
I Tenney, Ch. J., Rice, Cutting, May, Goodenow, J.J.
2

This question was propounded in the terms which are set forth in the head note

above.
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contestation, not only among politicions, but to some extent also
among courts and jurists.
Chancellor Kent, ib a note to the 257th page of the second volume
of his Commentaries, 4th edition, says
"Citizens, under our constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants born within
the United States, or naturalized under the laws of Congress. If a slave, born in
the United States, be manumitted, or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage,
or if a black man be born within the United States, and born free, he becomes thenceforward a citizen, but under such disablities as the laws of the States respectively
deem it expedient to prescribe to free persons of color."

This doctrine, though supported by high judicial authority, is by
no means universally admitted. Courts and jurists of high respectability and authority, have denied that negroes of African descent,
whose ancestors were of pure African blood and were brought into
this country and sold as slaves, are or can become citizens of the
United States, within the meaning of the constitution of the 'United
States. This doctrine has recently been maintained -with much
zeal, and at great length, in the case of Dred Scott vs. Sandford,
20 Hloward's U. S. R., 393. Substantially the same doctrined
have been promulgated in Amy vs Smith, 1 Littell's Ken. R. 883;
State vs. Claiborne,1 Meigs' Tenn. R. 831 ; Pendleton vs. State, 1
Eng. Ark. R. 509; Cooper vs. The Mayor of Savannah,4 Geo. 68;
and by DAGGETT, C. J. in Sate vs. Crandall,10 Conn. 340, in
Connecticut.
As to the correctness of those decisions, we express no opinion.
Each must stand upon its own intrinsic merits, and they -will
undoubtedly receive that degree of respect to which, as legal productions, they are justly entitled.-They do noi, however, affect the
question now before us.
Our present inquiry is confined to an interpretation of the provision in our own constitution already cited, and the term "citizen of
the United States," as used therein.
Art. iv, § 1, of the constitution of the United States, provides
that
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States."

Our inquiry therefore extends not only to the rights of free
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colored persons of African descent who were born within this State,
but also to the same class of persons who may have been born in
other States, but who .have become residents of this State.
Chief Justice Taney, in the opinion of the majority of the court
in the case of Dred Scott vs. Sandford, cited above, lays down the
following propositions as to citizenship of the United States:
Rawle, in his Commentaries, says:
"It is true every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at
the time of the. adoption of the constitution, recognized as citizens in the several.
States, became also citizens of this new politicalbody; but none other; it was formed
by them, and for them and their posterity; but for no one else. And the personal
rights and privileges guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty, were intended
to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities,
or who should afterwards, by birthright or otherwise, become members according
to the provisions of the constitution and the principles on which it was founded.It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate
political communities, into one political family, whose power, for certain specified
purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States. And it gave
to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not before
possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own
citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the
United States."
"The citizens of each State constituted the citizens of the United States when
the constitution was adopted. The rights which appertained to them as citizens of
those respective commonwealths accompanied them in the formation of the great,
compound commonwealth, which ensued. They became citizens of the latter without ceasing to be citizens of the former, and he who was subsequently born a citizen
of a State, became, at the moment of his birth, a citizen of the United States."
Rawle on the Const. p. 86.
"Every citizen of a State, is, ipso facto, a citizen of the United States." story
on the Const., vol., 3, p. 565.

Such being the operation of that provision of the constitution of
the United States which we have cited above, upon the condition of
those persons who were recognized as citizens of the several States
at the adoption of the constitution, it becomes pertinent to our inquiry to ascertain the political condition of the free colored people
of African descent in the several States, at that time. Were they
then recognized as citizens of any of the States which entered into
and composed a part of the United States? Let the constitutions
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of the States then existing, and the practice under them, answer.
The fact of citizenship may be -established in various ways. The
enjoyment of the elective franchise is believed to be one of the
highest tests of that fact. There may be citizenship without the
enjoyment of this right, as in the case of women, children, paupers,
and the like; but it is believed no instance can be found in which
the right to vote at our general elections has been conceded to persons born on our soil who were not at the time deemed citizens of
the States in which they enjoyed the right.
The constitution of the United States was adopted September
17, 1787.
The constitution of New York, adopted April 20, 1777, section
7, provides
"That every male inhabitant of full age, who shall have personally resided in
one of the counties of this state for six months immediately preceding the day of
election, shall at such election be entitled to vote for representative in said county
in assembly; if during the time aforesaid, he shall have been a freeholder possessing a freehold of the value of twenty pounds, within said county, or have rented a
tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings,.and been rated and actually
paid taxes to the State."

By the constitution of New York, adopted in 1821, Art. xi, § 1,
the qualification of electors was to some extent modified; the.word
"citizen" was substituted for the word "inhabitant," and other
modifications made, among which was added the following clause:
"1But no man of color, unless he shall have been three years a citizen of this
State, and for one year next preceding any election shall be seized and possessed of
a freehold estate of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars over and above all
debts and incumbrances charged thereon, and shall have been actually rated, and
paid a tax thereon, shall be entitled to vote at any such election."

The old constitution did not contain this provision discriminating
against the "man of color."
The constitution of New Jersey, adopted July 2, 1776, §4, provides,
"1That all inhabitants of this colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds,
proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county
in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election,
shall be entitled to vote for representatives in council and assembly; and also for
all other public officers that shall be elected by the people of the county at large."
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In 1844, the constitution of New Jersey was amended, and the
elective franchise was restricted to "white male citizens of the
United States."
Maryland adopted a constitution in 1776, the second section of
which provides that
-

,IAll freemen above twenty-one years of age, having a freehold of fifty acres of
land in the county in which they offer to vote, and residing therein, and all freemen having property in this State above the value of thirty pounds, cul'rent money,
and having resided in the county in which they offer to vote one whole year next
preceding the election, shall have a right of suffrage in the election of delegates for
such county."

And by the fourteenth section all persons qualified as aforesaid
to vote for delegates, were also made electors of senators.
The constitution was so amended in 1801-2 that the right of
suffrage was confined to "free white male citizens above twenty-one
years of age, and no others."
North Carolina adopted a constitution Dec. 18, 1776. This constitution contains the following provisions:
"SECT. 7. That all freemen of the age of twenty-one years, who have been
inhabitants of any one county within the State twelve months immediately preceding
the day of any election, and possessed of a freehold within the same county of fifty
acres of land, for six months next before, and on the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for a member of the senate.
"SECT. 8. That all freemen of the age of twenty-one years, who have been
inhabitants of any county within the State twelve months immediately preceding
the day of election, and shall have paid taxes, shall be entitled to vote for members
of the house of commons for the county in which he resides.
"SECT. 9. That all persons possessed of a freehold in any town in this State,
having a right of representation, and also all freemen who have been inhabitants of
any such town twelve months next before, and at the day of election, and shall have
paid public taxes, shall be entitled to vote for a member to represent such town in
the house of commons."

In 1835, the following amendment was adopted touching the right
of suffrage :
"No negro, free mulatto, or free persons of mixed blood descended from negro
ancestors to the fourth generation inclusive, (though one ancestor of each generation may have been a white person,) shall vote for members of the senate or house
of commons."
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In the case of State vs. Manuel, decided by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, in 1838, 2d Dev. & Bat., 20, GASTON, J., in a
very elaborate opinion of the Court, uses the following language:
",Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King
of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native born British subjects; those born out ofhis allegiance were aliens. Slavery did not exist in England,
but it did exist in the British colonies. Slaves were not in legal parlance persons,
butproperty. The moment the incapacity or disqualification of slavery was removed,
they became persons, and were then either British subjects or not British subjects,
accordingly as they were or were not born within the allegiance of the British King.
Upon the Revolution no other change took place in the law of North Carolina, than
was consequent upon the transition of a colony dependent on an European King, to
a free and sovereign State. Slaves remained slaves. British subjects in North
Carolina became North Carolina freemen. Foreigners, until made members of the
State, continued aliens. Slaves manumitted there become freemen-and therefore
if born within North Carolina, are citizens of North Carolina-and all free persons
born within the State, are born citizens of the State."

Again, he says:
"That constitution [1776] extended the elective franchise to every freeman who
had arrived at the age of twenty-one, and paid a public tax; and it is a matter of
universal notoriety that under it, free persons, without regard to color, claimed and
exercised the franchise until it was taken from free men of color, a few years since,
by our amended constitution."

The soundness of the doctrine of this opinion has since been
recognized by the same court in the case of State vs. Newsom, 5
Iredell, 250.
Sect. 2 of ch. 1 of the constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in
March, 1780, reads as follows:
"The senate shall be the first branch of the legislature, and the senators shall be
chosen in the following manner, viz.: there shall'be a meeting on the first Monday
in April, annually, forever, of the inhabitants of each town in the several counties
in this commonwealth, to be called by the selectmen, and warned in due course of
law, at least seven days before the first Monday in April, for the purpose of electing
persons to be senators and councillors; and at such meetings every male inhabitant
of twenty-one years of age and upwards, having a freehold estate within the commonwealth, of the annual income of three pounds, or any estate of the value of
sixty pounds, shall have a right to give in his vote for the senators for the district
of which he is an inhabitant. And to remove all doubts concerning the meaning of
the word 'inhabitant,' in this constitution, every person shall be considered an
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inhabitant, for the purpose of clecting and being elected into any office, or place
'within the State, in that town, district, or plantation, where he dwelleth, or hath
his home."

Slavery has not existed in Massachusetts since the adoption of
the constitution, in 1780; Com. vs. Ayes, 18 Pick. 193. And from
that day to the present, those freemen of African descent, who
possessed the qualifications required of white citizens, have enjoyed
the rights of the elective franchise in that State.
The constitutions of other States, adopted before and since the
formation of the present federal government, contained provisions
equally broad and liberal, with reference to the right of voting, as
those from which we have already quoted; while in others of the
thirteen States which originally composed the Union, the right ot
voting in the general elections was confined to "free male white
citizens." The same formula of words is also used to limit and
define the rights of electors in several of the constitutions of States
which have been created and admitted into the Union since the con7
stitution of the United States was adopted, and also in sundry laws
passed by Congress under the constitution. Whether this form of
words does not carry the implication that "citizens" exist who are
not white, we do not deem it important now to consider, nor do we
deem it essential to pursue this branch of our inquiry further at
this time.
Such was the condition of things in 1820, when Maine, then constituting a part of the State of Massachusetts, was erected into a
new and independent State, and her citizens, after having lived
under the constitution of 1780, for a period of forty years, formed
the constitution under which we now live. The convention which
formed that constitution was composed of our most intelligent and
influential citizens. Every important provision in that instrument
was closely scrutinized before it was adopted. Nor did the section
which prescribed the qualification of electors pass unchallenged.
When that section was under consideration, Mir. Vance, of Calais,
moved to insert the word "Negroes" after the words "Indians not
taxed."
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Mr. Holmes said:
-The 'Indians not taxed,' were excluded, not on account of their color, but of
their political condition. They are under the protection of the State, but they can
make and execute their own laws. They have never been considered members of
the body politic. But I know of no difference between the rights of the negro and
the white man. God Almighty has made none-our Declaration of Rights has made
none. That declares that ' all men' (without regard to colors) ' are born equally
free and independent."
"Mr. Vance and Dr. Rose spoke in favor of the motion, but it did not obtain.".Pcrioj'sDebates, p. 95.

From the adoption of the constitution to the present day, it is
believed there has been no instance in the State in which the right
to vote has been denied to any person resident within the State on
:account of his color.
in view of these facts and considerations, we are of the opinion
that our constitution does not discriminate between the different
races of people which constitute the inhabitants of our State, but
that the term " citizens of the United States," as used in that
instrument, applies as well to colored persons of African descent,
as to persons descended from white ancestors. Our answer, therefore, is, that
Free colored male persons of African descent, of the age of
twenty-one years and upwards, having a residence established in
some town or plantation in this State, three months next preceding
any election, and who are not paupers, aliens, nor. persons under
guardianship, are authorized, under the provisions of the constitution of this State, to be electors for governor, senators and representatives.
NOTE.-This question arose in Ponnsylvania, under the Constitution of 1700, which
gives the right of suffrage to "every Fnr.E5AI above the age of twenty-one years,"
and it was held by the Supreme Court of that State, that free negroes were not comprehended in those words. Hfobbs vs. Fogg, 6 Watts, 553, decided in 1837. The
course of reasoning adopted by Chief Justice Gibson, in delivering the opinion of the
court, is substantially the same as that employed by judge Taney, in the famous
Dred Scott case. The same point had arisen and been decided in the same way in
1795, at Philadelphia. See 6 Watts, 555. The present constitution uses the words
- every white frceman."-EDS. A. L. R.

CONOVER vs. THE MAYOR, &c. ET AL.

In the Supreme Court of MYew Yorkc-S'pecial Term, October, 1857.
DANIEL D. CONOVER vS. THE MAYOR &C., CHARLES DEVLIN ET AL.

An injunction may be granted by a court of blended equity and common law powers,
to restrain proceedings of an equitable nature in another court of co-ordinate
jurisdiction and similar powers, in a litigation substantially first commenced and

still pending in the former; and this though the pleadings in the first suit were
not at the time of the institution of the second, sufficiently comprehensive to
embrace the relief therein sought, if such relief could by appropriate proceedings
be adequately obtained in the court first obtaining possession of the litigation.

The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
PEABODY, J.-This litigation has its foundation in the claims of
the plaintiff Conover and the defendant Devlin respectively, to the
office of Street Commissioner of the City of New York.
The plaintiff claims the office by virtue of an appointment by the
governor, and the defendant Devlin claims it by virtue of an appointment by the mayor and aldermen, and each claims to be now
the actual incumbent of the office.
No suit or legal proceeding to test their claims in this respect,
has ever been instituted by either; and no adjudication on the
subject of general obligation on them, or at all obligatory.on third
persons, seems ever to have been had.
There are, however, appertaining to said office of Street Commissioner certain books and papers, maps and documents, which
have been and continue to be the subject of litigation between them,
and the claim of each of them by virtue of the office, to the custody
and use of them, not only has been the subject of legal proceedings
and adjudication between them, but continues to constitute more or
less directly the basis of this and the several other suits which will
have to be considered herein.
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On the 19th day of June, 1857, Conover applied to me as a
Justice of the Supreme Court, under Sec. 61 of 1 R. S., p. 125,
for an order directing Devlin to show cause why he should not be
compelled forthwith to deliver to him (Conover) the books and
papers, maps and documents belonging or appertaining to said
office of Street Commissioner of the City of New York. That order
was made and was returnable on the 23d day of June, and the examination of the subject, including the taking of testimony and
arguments of counsel, was proceeded with from day to day until
the 29th, and my decision was finally made that said Conover was
entitled to said books and papers, and an order was made, that he
should deliver them accordingly forthwith.
On this hearing and trial Mr. Conover was represented by Mr.
Win. Curtis Noyes and Mr. D. D. Field, and Mr. Devlin by Mr.
James T. Brady, and the City of New York, though not a party to
the record, but claiming to be interested in the question, was represented throughout, by Mr. Busteed, Corporation Counsel, and Mr.
D. E. Sickles.
In that proceeding the whole subject of controversy was the
right to the possession and the use of the books and papers, maps
and documents belonging or appertaining to the office of Street
Commissioner; the plaintiff herein claiming to recover possession
of them, and the defendant Devlin, denying the right of the plaintiff, and claiming himself to be entitled to retain and continue
the use and custody of them.
This was a direct proceeding between the parties. The only
question tried was, the right of the parties respectively to the books
and papers, &c. The plaintiff claimed the right to them. The
defendant denied the title of the plaintiff, and asserted his own
title to them. The plaintiff in reply denied the title of the defendant and re-asserted his right. Each asserted his own title and
denied the title of the other, and the issues, thus joined, were tried
with much care and deliberation, and decided.
This decision has never been reviewed, as by law it might have
been, by an appelate or revisory tribunal; has never been, in any
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manner, reversed or vacated, and, accordingly, the judgment there
pronounced is in full force and obligatory upon the parties.
It may be correct, or it may be erroneous ; and, as to its binding
effect upon the parties, -while it remains, it is not important whether
it is the one or the other. Neither party has appealed from it,
and as to each, it is now, I suppose, conclusive.
No other proceeding or suit to the same end, has been instituted,
and the decision or judment then rendered cannot properly be
reviewed, nor can the question there decided properly be readjudicated in any collateral suit or litigation between the parties. It
may be reviewed in a proper manner (by certiorari, for instance),
and, if incorrect, may be reversed; but that must be by a direct
proceeding for the purpose. Until that is done, however, it remains a valid and conclusive judgment, determining the rights of
the parties in the premises; as does, indeed, the decision of every
court, even the humblest in the land, until reversed or vacated.
This proposition, I do not understand is by any one in any manner denied. It may, at times, in the litigation that has followed,
have been forgotten or lost sight of, and thus have been disregarded
for a time, but I am not aware that any one has ventured to gainsay it or claimed the reverse of it.
For the purposes of this suit, then, that judgment is conclusive
upon the rights of the parties, Conover and Devlin, to the books and
papers, &c.
The city, although represented on that trial, and throughout the
whole of it, by counsel, and beard at full length, still, if it have
any rights not represented by the direct parties to the suit, is not
concluded as one of the parties to the record. It could only assert
its rights and controvert the claims it should deem adverse to them
through the medium of representation of one or the other of the
parties to the record.
So far, therefore, as its rights were properly represented by
either of these parties, the city also is concluded, but as to any
other rights not so represented, it is not concluded.
In other words, although the city was present by its counsel, and
heard at length throughout the trial, it could only be heard on the
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subject in controversy, the rights of the parties to the proceeding.
It could not set up its own rights not connected with those of either
party, if it had any such. It could take part in the discussion and
trial of the questions embraced in the record before the court, and
advocate or oppose the claims of either party; but that is all it
could do. The issues joined there are the only issues to which the
city could speak, and on them only was it heard. So far, therefore, as a decision for or against one of these parties binds it as
being represented there by the party as to the right passed upon,
it is concluded. In short, that, like any other judgment, I suppose, binds conclusively only the parties to it and their privies. If
the city have rights to that property independent of the office and
of the officer, those rights remain probably unaffected.
It is true that a want of jurisdiction would invalidate all I did
there, as to the parties as well as to strangers, but that objection is
not taken here either in the pleadings, on the points submitted, nor
was it urged, that I recollect, on the argument. My jurisdiction in
that matter, then, must be deemed to be admitted, or at least
undisputed here.
What rights had the city which were not connected with the
office or officer; for as to those only, is it not bound by the decision
in the statutory proceeding ? The statute under which I was acting provides a remedy by which a successor to an office may get
possession of "any books or papers belonging or appertaining to
such office." It follows that the officer has a right to the possession of such books and papers. The petition by which the proceeding was inaugurated, and all the subsequent papers and measures,
had reference to the books and papers, and described the things
sought as "belonging or appertaining to the office of Street Commissioner of the City of New York." The claim was limited not
only to these books, &c., but the claim to th~em was only to be possessed of them to the extent to which they belonged to the office.
As to "the books and papers belonging or appertaining to the office
of Street Commissioner of the City of New York," what rights had
the city independent of and as against the Street Commissioner?
For one or the other of those parties, it was conceded on all hands,
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in that proceeding, as it is in this, was and is Street Commissioner.
All agreed, therefore, and all agree here, that the actual Street
Commissioner was and is before the court, and the city is represented, so far as that officer may represent it in a matter of this
kind.
To ascertain exactly the dividing line between the rights of the
city and those of the Street Commissioner would require too much
time for the present occasion, and is not necessary; it is sufficient
at this point to say that the city had no rights inconsistent with the
possession and use of them by the officer, whoever lie might be. It
will hardly be contended that he had no rights; that the city could
wholly divert the records, "books and papers appertaining to the
office," from the officer; and as Conover was not attempting by the
proceeding before me, to establish what were the rights of the officer over them, or to acquire any stated, definite right over, in or to
them, but only to acquire the possession or control, by which he
might exercise the rights which appertained or belonged to the
office, and limited his claim to that, more or less, it seems to follow
that the claims he made can hardly be questioned by the city more
than Devlin.
This is the whole breadth and scope of his claim, and of the decision on it, and the whole end and purpose of the process in execution of the judgment, the enforcement of which was arrested by the
injunction from the Court of Common Pleas.
That process could not, in its nature, nor could the proceedings in
which it issued, by any means, give to Conover any other rights
than those which that officer (the Street Commissioner) by virtue of
his office would have, and he having been adjudged for the purpose
of that proceeding to be the officer, it follows, inevitably, that he
had the rights incident to that character. It is not important to
ascertain what those rights were: no issue was or is made on that
point. Whether they were greater or less, they were what he asked,
and all he was attempting to acquire, and all he could acquire; and
it follows that the general restraint imposed against the pursuit of
that remedy under the statute, and against his having anything to
do with the books, &c., was a restraint contrary to his rights. His
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prayer, in substance and effect, was, that being Street Commissioner, he might be invested with such control over those articles as
he, by virtue of said office, was entitled to, and no other or greater.
I had decided that he was such officer, and, of course, be was entitled to such control over them as the office gave him ; and, without
deciding or inquiring what those rights were, I had ordered the
officer to produce them, that I might give to him the power of exercising those rights, whatever they might be, more or less.
That he (if Street Commissioner) had some right or other to those
books and papers, that he had (if he were such officer) the right to
some kind of possession, use or control of them, is not, and I assume,
cannot be denied.
The rights of the city (if it had any, except through the office)
commenced only where the rights of the office terminated. As to
its rights connected with the officer, it was represented before me
by the officer, and was concluded by the decision there. As to its
other rights, (if it have any), they are entirely subordinate to those
of the office, and afford no ground for an interruption of the possession, or a restraint of the use of them by the officer.
The history of the legal proceedings on this subject is important
in considering this motion for an injunction and receiver.
The proceeding before me, relative to the possession of the books
and papers, was commenced by Conover on the 19th of June, and
on the 10th of July my decision was made, that he was Street Commissioner, and entitled to the books and papers.
On the 27th of June, the city commenced a suit in the Supreme
Court against Conover, and obtained, ex parte, an injunction
restraining him from taking possession of the books and papers.
On the 13th of July, that injunction, on motion, was dissolved. On
the 10th of July, a certiorariwas obtained, ex parte, by which proceedings before me were stayed until the 18th, when it was superceded, after argument.
On the 14th of July, a resolution was pending before the Board
of Councilmen to deliver the books and papers into the possession
of the Corporation counsel, and instruct him to allow Devlin to use
them, apparently intended to defeat the proceeding before me ; and
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Conover, in this suit against Devlin and the corporation, procured,
ex parte, an injunction restraining the passage of the resolution,
and also restraining any act to defeat that proceeding, which injunction is still in force.
On the 18th of July, a suit in the Common Pleas was commenced
by the city against Conover and the Sheriff of the county, and an
injunction procured, restraining Conover, his counsellors, attorneys
and agents, from receiving or interfering with, and the sheriff from
taking or interfering with them, and Devlin from delivering them
to him. At the time of the service of the injunction on Conover,
the warrant issued by me for the production of the books, &c., was
in the hands of an officer for service, and he proceeded to bring
before me certain of the books, after the service of the injunction.
For this an order was made that he be imprisoned for contempt.
About the same time, the court, after solemn argument, decided to
continue the injunction, and refused to dissolve it.
On the 20th of July, the city filed a supplemental bill in the
Common Pleas, alleging the service of the original complaint and
injunction, Farrington's seizure of the books, Bertholf's possession of some of them by my order, Mr. Field's advice to disregard
the injunction, Conover's entry into the apartments devoted to the
office, danger of loss or damage to the books and papers, and
alleging that the proceedings before me were without jurisdiction,
and praying for an injunction against Farrington, Bertholf and Mr.
Field, which was granted, ex parte, and afterward, on argument,
dissolved as to Mfr. Field, but continued and a dissolution refused as
to Farrington and Bertholf.
On the 13th of August, Conover filed a supplemental complaint
in this suit, (commenced as above on the 14th of July), adding as
parties Farrington and Bertholf, and stating that the action was
commenced July 14; that since that time I had issued warrants in
the statutory proceeding, and that under one of them some of the
books had been brought before me, and that further proceedings
were prevented by the interference of the city and Devlin, and that
plaintiff apprehended that they would continue to prevent the execution of the warrant, and the completion of the proceeding, and
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demanding judgment that the warrant might be executed, and the
obstacles thereto removed, and a receiver of the books, &c., appointed and directed to allow Conover to use them: and an injunction against the city and Devlin, their agents, &c., restraining them
from interfering with the books, &c., and from doing anything to
prevent their delivery to Conover, or the execution of the warrants,
except by a review of the statutory proceedings before me; and an
injunction against Bertholf and Farrington, restraining them from
delivering the books to any person except pursuant to the warrant,
was demanded. On this an order was made to show cause why an
injunction as asked should not be granted, and a receiver appointed,
and a temporary injunction was allowed in the mean time.
There was also a suit commenced in the Supreme Court by Conover against the city and Devlin and the sheriff, stating Conover's
claims to the books, &c.; the proceedings before me, my decision
thereon; the issuing of the warrants; the inability of Conover to
get the books; threats by Devlin to dispossess him of the apartments by force; the possession by Devlin of certain bids for contracts with the city; the appointments to office made by him; the
commencement by Conover of the suit in this court on the 14th of
July; the suit by the city in the Common Pleas on the 18th of
July, and the proceedings therein; and demanding judgment that
the city be restrained from proceeding in the Common Pleas; that
the sheriff be enjoined from executing process therein; and that
Devlin be restrained from performing duties as Street Commissioner until his right to the office should be established on quo warranto.
In that suit, also, an order was made .that defendants show cause
why an injunction should not issue and a receiver be appointed, and
a temporary injunction was allowed in the mean time.
On the two orders to show cause just mentioned, a motion is made
for the injunction prayed for in the complaints, and for a receiver,
and that motion I am now to decide.
The necessity for something which shall confine the litigation in
this matter to some one court, is most apparent from the above narrative. The two courts-this and the Common Pleas-have decided

CONOVER vs. THE MAYOR, &c. ET AL.

the same questions differently, and are diametrically opposed to
each other. This court, Mr. Justice Roosevelt presiding, in the suit
by the city against Conover, commenced June 27, dissolved an
injunction on grounds apparently substantially the same as those on
which a similar one was afterwards sustained in the Common Pleas.
The case before Mr. Justice Roosevelt is reported in 5 Abbott
171, and his opinion is characterized by his usual ability and
research. The Common Pleas, Judge Ingraham presiding, in an
opinion of great ability, gives the reasons for the decisions in that
court. The facts on which the two decisions proceed differ but little, if at all, and that little, if either way, is in the direction opposite to the difference of the decisions and opinions. The one before
Mr. Justice Roosevelt did not contain, originally, a statement of
the statutory proceedings, which were, at the time the argument of
the motion was commenced before him, incomplete. The case made
in the Common Pleas did contain a statement of those proceedings
in the plaintiff's complaint, and that I had decided that Conover
was the officer, and entitled to the books and papers. But both of
them took cognizance of those proceedings, however, and considered
them, as is shown in their opinions respectively; and the two cases
were not, I think, even in this respect, materially different. The
decision in this court preceded that in the Common Pleas, and was
urged on the argument of the case in that court, as appears, I
believe, from the opinion, not only as an authority, but as establishing by adjudication the rights of the parties. But the argument
did not prevail, and the injunction, on solemn argument, dissolved
and denied in this court, was subsequently granted, and, on like
solemn argument, confirmed within fifty days afterward in that
court.
Here are the decisions of two courts directly in conflict on the
same subject matter. Which is correct, is not a matter of inquiry
here. We are not reviewing either of those decisions. I ought to
feel great diffidence at approaching such a task as reviewing the
decision of either of those eminent judges: and that no such duty
is imposed on me is matter of most hearty self-gratulation.
The two courts, thus starting from the same point, have taken
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opposite directions. Other differences of opinion, equally striking,
between that court and this and between judges of the two courts,
have occurred in the course of this litigation repeatedly, but an
enumeration of the cases of difference of opinion is not important.
The instance I have given shows the impracticability of continuing
parallel litigations in two courts, of the same matters. Indeed,
evidence or illustration of such a fact seems hardly necessary, for
it is within the observation of almost every one that on the complicated and vexed questions which come under the investigation of
courts of justice (and this is certainly embraced in that class), courts,
like individual minds, must differ frequently. Every dissent of a
member of a court from the opinion of his brethren, and every
reversal by an appellate court of the decision of its inferior, are
instances of difference of judicial opinion on exactly the same facts,
stated in exactly the same words; and neither of these cases of
difference is of rare occurrence. Both, on the contrary, are very
common.
The two courts thus pursuing opposite courses of decision, it is
manifestly desirable that the litigation in one should be suspended,
and the whole controversy conducted to its conclusion in the other.
It is more than desirable. It is indispensable to a reasonable,
orderly and decorous administration of justice. It is necessary.
How shall this be accomplished? How shall it be decided in
which court it shall be continued? And when that is decided, how
shall the decision be enforced ? Assuming that both courts have
jurisdiction to the same extent, and can administer justice with
equal facility and benefit, the rule that the court first having cognizance of the subject shall retain it and. draw the litigation wholly
to itself, seems to be properly applicable. It is perfectly free from
odium, consistent with the fullest comity, the most delicate respect,
and the amplest fraternal regard and consideration for the other
tribunal. If there be no reason in the constitution of the courts
why one is more competent under all circumstances existing, or
likely to arise, to assume the whole of this controversy and conduct
it to an issue than the other, priority in acquiring possession of the
case may with propriety be allowed to determine it. On the subject
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of jurisdictional power, there can surely be no objection to this
court, succeeding as it does to all the powers of the Court of King's
Bench, and having, on every subject within the jurisdiction of a
State court, the fullest common law jurisdiction. It has also all the
powers of the late Court of Chancery in the administration of equity;
and, territorially, its jurisdiction for every purpose is co-extensive
with the State.
The jurisdiction of the Common Pleas, on the contrary, for many
purposes, is limited to the county, and, although it may now have
jurisdiction over all the parties to this litigation, circumstances may
not improbably arise in which the addition of a party residing or
tarrying without the county, or any one of numerous other causes,
may make the more comprehensive jurisdiction of this court desirable
and necessary to the complete determination of the matters in controversy.
The suit by the city against Conover in this court, after the
decision by Mr. Justice Roosevelt, was discontinued. The time
when it was done does not, that I perceive, appear from the papers
before me, but I think that it may have been before the suit in the
Common Pleas was commenced.
After this decision, however, and before the commencement of
the suit in the Common Pleas, this suit was commenced in this court
by Conover against the City and Devlin. Whether this suit was
commenced before or after the discontinuance of the one in this
court brought by the city, does not, I think, appear; but the decision
by Mr. Justice Roosevelt, in that suit, dissolving the injuixction on
motion, was made on the 18th, and this suit was commenced on the
14th day of July; so that the probability is, and I suppose I may
assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that that suit of
the 13th, was in existence on the 14th. This court, then, first
became possessed of the subject of this litigation by the commencement of that suit on the 27th of June last. The aid of this court
was then invoked by the city in a suit relative to this same matter
against Conover. The city having thus selected the forum in which
it choose to implead him, he, when on the 14th of the following
month (July) he had occasion, for the first time, to invoke affirma-
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tively, the aid of a court of general jurisdiction, commenced his suit
here, whither he had been already brought, and where he then was
a defendant in a suit on the same subject matter.
In the suit first commenced in this court by the city against
Conover, the rights of the plaintiffs therein to the books and papers
as against Conover were the basis of the claim; and it is apparent,
from the opinion of Mr. Justice Roosevelt, on the motion for an
injunction, that both the title of the plaintiffs to the books, &c., and
the rights of Conover as the officer, were set up and discussed,
substantially as they have been since.
In the suit by him against the city and Devlin, commenced on
the 14th of July, he was bound, by a regard for propriety, if no
other law, not to seek to wrest the litigation from the court in which
it had been commenced, by appealing to another court for the relief
he required, and accordingly he sought counter-relief, as he should
do, in this court, then having the litigation before it. It was the
right of the party first appealing to the court to select his tribunal.
-The city had exercised that right, and Conover was bound to follow
to the same court, and not, by seeking another, to embarrass and
entangle matters already more than sufficiently complicated.
All the suits between these parties, from the one commenced by
the city on the 27th of June, have been on the same subject, the
rights of the parties to these books, &c. In all, the city has claimed
to withhold them by virtue of its ownership, they having been
bought and paid for with its funds; and, in all, Conover has claimed
possession of them by virtue of his office, and, in all, since the decision in his favor in the statutory proceeding, he has claimed that as
an adjudication of his right.
It was urged on the argument, in opposition to this motion, that
the pleadings in the suit or suits in this court, at the time the suit
in the Common Pleas was commenced, were not sufficiently comprehensive to enable the Court to determine the whole matter in controversy. I am not certain that this is the case, but it is not
necessary, for the purposes for which I am referring to these suits,
that they should have been. I do not attempt to show or say that
any two of the suits, or the pleadings in them, have been exactly
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and in all respects alike. They have been, all of them, concerning
the same subject matter, however; all have had the same general
end in view. On the one hand, Conover has always endeavored, on
the same ground, to get the books, &c., and on the other, the city
has endeavored, on the same ground of ownership, to defeat his
claim and keep them from him; and if any facts, since deemed
material on either side, were not contained in the earlier pleadings,
they could readily have been introduced by way of amendment or
supplement, and their absence furnished, probably, no necessity for
even a new suit, and if it did, it certainly furnished none for flying
to a new court.
It seems to me quite evident, from what has been said, that this
whole litigation should be drawn to one or the other of the two
courts; that it cannot, with advantage to the litigants, or without
detriment to the public interest, be suffered to proceed as it has
done-a step in one court in one direction, followed by a step in the
other court in an opposite direction; and that it should be arrested
in one or the other.
How shall this be accomplished ? Neither court will, or perhaps
can, interfere directly with the action of the other. Either may,
however, operate on the suitors before it; and the means urged in
this motion seems to me quite proper. At all events, an injunction
is the means sanctioned by precedents in such cases. It is the
measure of familiar use for that purpose, and I see no reason why
it should not be adopted in this case.
It was urged, on the argument, that injunctions in such cases had
only been used to restrain suits in courts of law, and that such a
remedy as to suits in courts of equity had not been adopted in
practice ; and the fact must be very much so, for, until recently, no
instance has occurred in this country, or in that whence we derive
our jurisprudence, of the existence of two courts of equity in the
same State having concurrent jurisdiction in cases of the same class.
Of course, the practice cannot have obtained under such circumstances ; but there is no reason, in principle, why, in cases of this
kind, it should not be applied to a court of equity as well as to a
court of law. Is there any doubt that a court of equity would
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restrain proceedings against its officers for acts done in their official
character, if those proceedings were in another court having equity
powers, as readily as if they were in a court having only common
law powers ? If, for instance, a receiver, or a guardian, or a committee of a lunatic, appointed in one of our courts, were prosecuted
in any other court for his official acts, is there any doubt that the
court from which he derived his authority would enjoin such suits ?
and would it make any difference whether those suits were brought
in a court having equity as well as common law powers, or in one
having common law powers only ?
So in the case of a bill of peace, which this case, in all respects,
very much resembles, is there any doubt that if the suits, -which it
would otherwise be proper to restrain, were pending in courts having equity as well as common law powers, they would not, for that
reason, be restrained ? If so, in this State, where all courts have
equity as well as common law powers, the beneficent remedy known
by that name must be abandoned, certainly where the suits to be
restrained are in more than one court.
And so in every case where the restraint was demanded for any
other reason than because the court in which the suit was pending
lacked the power of administering equity. Restraint for that reason cannot now be required in a system like ours where all courts
have those powers. The existence of equity powers in the courts
will do away with the necessity for such restraint in a large class of
cases, because the absence of those powers would often be a cause
for restraining proceedings in such a court, on the ground that the
controversy could not properly be ended and disposed of without
the exercise of those powers ; but it is only in cases of that class
that the existence of equity powers in the courts is at all material
or the question whether their prosecution of suits in them shall be
restrained. Suppose, for instance, that an equity suit were commenced in this coiurt against ten or twelve defendants, and one
defendant, having occasion for affirmative relief which would properly authorize the filing of a cross-bill, should commence a suit in
that nature in the Common Pleas, and another should file one in
the Superior Court, and another should file his in the City Court of
Brooklyn, and another should file one in a court of New Jersey,
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and another in Connecticut, all those courts having plenary equity
as well as common law powers, who can doubt that some one of the
courts would be bound to restrain the parties before it from proceeding in the other courts, and draw the entire litigation to itself ?
Who would be found to insist that the parties plaintiff in none of
those suits should be restrained, because, forsooth, the courts had
equity as well as common law powers ? I may add, who would
doubt which court should issue the mandate, this court having first
had possession of the subject matter of the controversy, and having
ample powers to determine it in all its parts ? Undoubtedly, the
case of Grant vs. Quick (5 Sandf. S. C. R. 612) was very properly
decided ; and if a case were wanting to prove the necessity of confining litigation between the same parties on the same subject matter to the court in which it originates, when that court has ample
power to dispose of it legally and equitably (which is all there is in
that case, and all it is properly an authority for), I would commend
this case before me as an illustration never to be surpassed. It is
not a little remarkable that an authority so apposite should have
escaped the attention of counsel so astute, in the suit in the Common Pleas. In that case (Grant vs. Quick) it appeared that a suit
had been brought by Quick against Grant in the Common Pleas to
compel a surrender of certain securities, and Grant (the defendant
in the Common Pleas) commenced a suit in the Superior Court
against Quick for some relief, properly matter for a cross bill, and
obtained an injunction restraining the suit in the Common Pleas,
and on motion it was dissolved by the court, apparent!y with no
little zeal, Mr. Justice Duer saying, "The prior institution of that
suit (meaning Quick vs. Grant in the Common Pleas), and its actual
pendency, are regarded by me as conclusive reasons for granting
the motion in its full extent," &c. "It may be true, that all the
matters set forth in this complaint cannot with propriety be set forth
in an answer," &c.,
*
*
"or if contained there, cannot
be made the ground of the affirmative relief to which the plaintiff
deems himself entitled; but there is one obvious and conclusive
reply. If affirmative relief cannot be granted," &c.,
*
*
"upon his answer, he may file a complaint in the Common Pleas,
10
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in the nature of a cross bill, and that court will stay proceedings
in the first suit, until both are at issue, so that both may be decided
*
*
"There -will be, in
*
at the same time," &c.
reality, but one controversy." "The prior jurisdiction which the
court has acquired, I have no right, and will not attempt to disturb." The correctness of that decision, and of the opinion of Mr.
Justice Duer in that case, will never be questioned by a lawyer.
"This decision," says the reporter, "was commended by the judges
of the Supreme Court and the Common Pleas." I am sure it must
have been; and if it had been cited in this case in the Common
Pleas, and the case there had shown, what fully appears here, that
there was at least one suit pending in this court between the same
parties respecting the same subject matter; and that another, of
earlier date, by the same plaintiff as the one there, was still pending here, or had just been discontinued after a decision in it adverse
to the plaintiffs, I am sure that the learned judge of that court,
in his decision, would have given utterance to the operations of his
mind, in language not unlike that of our eloquent and venerable
cotemporary, and would have embraced the opportunity for re-affirming his commendation of the principles of enlightened equity and
elevated comity on which the decision in that case, in the Superior
Court proceeds.
My conclusions are:
I. That the right to those books and papers as to the parties
hereto, Devlin and Conover, is, by virtue of the decision in the
statutory proceeding between them, res ad~judicata,and that they
are concluded thereby.
IL That as to the city, it has rights to them, but that those rights
are chiefly for the purposes and uses of the office to which they have
been dedicated by it.
III. That as to all the rights the city has on that ground, it was
represented by the officer in that proceeding, and as to them it -was
bound by the decision therein as privy.
IV. That as to the rights of the cify, other than those it has
through the office, (if it have any others), they are entirely subject
to those of the office, and are only the residuum, or what remains
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after all the purposes of the office for which they are or may be
serviceable have been answered.
V. That as to those rights, which, at most, are rights to them as
articles of 'merchandise, and not for their contents or value as connected with the purposes of the office, they being subordinate to the
rights of the office, constitute the basis of no legal claim against the
officer, and particularly of none to an adverse possession of them or
to a restraint of the use of them by him, and therefore constitute
no reason against the granting of the motion for an injunction in
this case.
VI. As to the course of litigation on this subject, that the court
first having possession of the case-its powers being adequate to
the administration of complete justice in the premises-should
retain its jurisdiction and confine the litigation to that forum.
VII. That efforts by either party (and particularly by the party
invoking the aid of the court first in possession of the case) to
divert the litigation to another court, should be restrained, and that
for that purpose an injunction is the usual and proper remedy.
VIII. That it is most especially the duty of the court not to
permit a transition from it to another court by such a party, after
an adverse decision on his claim in the court to which resort is first
had by him.
IX. That the practice in courts of equity, of confining litigation
on a subject to the court in which it originates, is of peculiar value
in this case; that it seems to be necessary to a consistent, orderly
and effectual administration of justice; and especially so .to that
desideratum in all cases like this, a speedy termination of controversy.
X. That the propriety of the remedy in a case of this kind is not
affected by the fact that the court secondly acquiring jurisdiction of
the matter has equity as well as common law powers.
The injunction asked, therefore, must be granted; but no sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver seems to be shown,
or will arise from the injunction now ordered, and that part of the
motion must be denied.

BALLBECK vs. DONALDSON.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsyflvania,Philadelphia,Mareh,1855.
BALLBECK vs. DONALDSON.
1. A trust in favor of the grantor cannot be inferred in a conveyance absolute upon
its face, from proof that he continued to retain possession of the property, and
that no money was paid by the grantee.
2. Whether an express agreement, resting in parol, that the grantee should hold
the title in trust for the grantor, can be enforced quere?
[Error to the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia.]

The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court.
A. . &J. E. Gowen, for the plaintiffs in error, contended,
1. That oral evidence of the absence of a consideration is inadmissible to defeat the operation of an absolute deed.
2. That the parol creation of a trust estate is interdicted by the
Pennsylvania statute of frauds, the decision in Murphy vs. Hlbert,
7 Barr, 420, to the contrary notwithstanding.
G. 111. Wharton, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KNox, J.-Ths was an action of ejectment brought by David
Ballbeck against Hugh Donaldson and Joseph Vardin, to recover
the possession of certain real estate in the City of Philadelphia.
The plaintiff's case depends upon the validity of a deed from
Donaldson, the defendant, to Mrs. Eliza Braceland, bearing date
November 4th, A. D. 1843, and recorded on the 16th day of
January, 1849. The heir at law of Mrs. Braceland was the wife
of the plaintiff, who was dead, leaving a will by which all her real
estate was devised to her husband.
The defendant Donaldson denied that the plaintiff's mother-inlaw was the Mrs. Eliza Braceland to whom he had made the conveyance in November, 1843; and he also asserted, that, in case
her identity was found by the jury, the evidence showed that the
conveyance to Mrs. Braceland was in trust for the benefit of the
grantor.
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Considerable evidence was given on both sides upon the question
of identity which was fairly submitted to the jury, and of which no
complaint is now made.
In addition it was shown by the defendant that the original deed
was in his possession upon the trial, and that no possession of the
disputed property had been taken by Mrs. Braceland or those
claiming under her, but that it had been occupied and used as his
own exclusively from the date of the deed to the day of the trial,
and likewise, that Mrs. Braceland who lived until March, 1846, was
poor, having an income of about two hundred and fifty dollars per
annum. A conveyance was also in evidence from a Mrs. Braceland
to William Caldwell, dated 14th November, 1849, and from Caldwell to the defendant Donaldson by two deeds dated one in Nov.
1850, and one in Dec. 1851.
The learned judge of the District Court charged the jury, "that
if they should determine the question of identity in favor of the
plaintiff, there was still another point taken by the defendant's
counsel which they were to consider, and that was whether there
was not a trust in favor of the grantor or defendant Donaldson in
the deed to Eliza Braceland."
In this there was error. If the question of identity was found in
favor of the plaintiff, the next question that arose under the evidence was whether or not the conveyance was ever perfected by a
delivery of the deed. This was a question of fact for the jury.
The recording of the deed was prima facie evidence of its delivery,
and the burthen of proof was upon the defendant to satisfy the jury
that it had never been delivered, and for this purpose it was legitimate to show the possession of the title papers and the occupancy
of the property.
The condition in life of the Mrs. Eliza Braceland under whom
the plaintiff claimed, and her residence were proper subjects of
inquiry upon the question of identity, but not upon that of delivery.
The consideration recited in the deed, and which was acknowledged
by it to have been received by the grantor from the grantee was
six thousand eight hundred dollars. Now the presumption was, in
the absence of explanatory evidence, th-it this was a purchase, and
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not a gift; and if the plaintiff's mother-in-law was in reduced circumstances, the probability that she was the grantee would be
lessened, but if her identity was once established, the effect of the
decree could not be impaired by the existence of her poverty. For
when delivered, it would pass the title as between the parties to it,
whether founded upon a valuable consideration or not. A deed
absolute upon its face cannot be converted into a deed of trust for
the benefit of the grantor by proof that no money was paid by the
grantee, and that the grantor had remained in possession for three
years after the date of the conveyance. It is unnecessary to determine, whether an express agreement, resting in parol, made at the
time of the delivery of the deed, that the grantee should hold the
title for the benefit of the grantor can be enforced, as the point is
not raised in the case under consideration. All that we now decide
is that such an agreement cannot be inferred from the poverty of
the grantee, the continuation of the grantor in possession, and the
production by him at the trial of the original deed of conveyance.
Neither the acts or declarations of Mr. Donaldson, nor the statement of Mrs. Eliza Braceland in reference to her papers were evidence, as the wife was not shown to have been the husband's agent,
and Mrs. Braceland did not speak to the defendant or in his
presence.
If the case is presented upon another trial as it appears upon our
paper books, its result will depend upon two questions, viz: 1st.
Was the plaintiff's mother-in-law the person named in the deed
from Donaldson? 2d. Was the deed delivered? If these questions are, found for the plaintiff he is entitled to a verdict, otherwise
he has no case.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.

NELSON vs. VON BONNHORST.

Tn the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
JAMES NELSON, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR VS. S. F. VON BONNHORST ET AL.,
FOR USE, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR.
A sealed instrument in these words: "Due A. $1,071, for value received, which I
hereby promise to pay whenever, IN mY opiNIoN, my circumstanceswill be such as
to enable me so to do," does not create any legal obligation, which can be enforced
by action; nor will it support a narr alleging a promise by the obligor to pay
"whenever his circumstances were such, &c.," with an averment of ability
to pay.
(Error to the District Court of Alleghany County.)

This was an action of debt brought by S. F. Von Bonnhorst & Co.
for the use of Alvin Wilkins, against James Nelson, upon a specialty,
in the words following, to wit:
"PITTSnunG, Jsxu.inY 10, 1852.
Due S. F. Von Bonnhorst & Co., ton hundred and seventy-one dollars forty-six
cents, for value received, which I hereby agree to pay whenever, in my opinion, my
circumstances will be such as to enable me so to do, any receipt to the contrary
notwithstanding. Witness my hand and seal the date first above written.
JA3ES NE soN. [L. s."]

The narr assigns an undertaking and promise on the part of
defendant to pay "whenever his circumstances were such as to
enable him so to do," and avers that "his circumstances were such
as to enable him to pay." Defendant pleaded "'non assum~psit,
payment with leave, &@.," and on the trial added "want of consideration and release."
The plaintiff on the trial put the due bill in evidence and rested.
The defendant on his side called S. F. Von Bonnhorst, one of the
legal plaintiffs, and the counsel of the beneficial plaintiff objecting,
the court sustained the objection and sealed a bill of exceptions at
request of the defendant.
Defendant then called a witness to prove that the paper upon
which suit was brought is in the handwriting of S. F. Von Bonnhorst, and that a paper of same date signed by "B. iP. S'kenberger
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6y S. . Von Bonnhorst J- Co.," and by "Stephens, Slwnberger
&.Co. by S. P. Von Bonnkorst & Co.," is also in his handwriting.
The paper was then offered in evidence, objected to, objection overruled and paper read to the jury; it bore even date with the due
bill, and was a release of an indebtedness from Nelson to Stephens
& Schcenberger.
The defendant then closed, and the court directed the jury to
find for the plaintiffs, subject to its opinion whether upon the whole
evidence in the case the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
After argument on the questions reserved, the court (HAMPTON,
Pres't.,) delivered the following opinion:

"This was an action of debt on a sealed instrument, of which the
following is a copy, viz:
'Due S. F. Von Bonnhorst & Co., Pittsburg, January 10th, 1852, ten hundred
and seventy-one dollars forty-six cents, for value received, which I hereby agree to
pay whenever in my opinion my circumstances will enable me to do so, any receipt
to the contrary notwithstanding. Witness my hand and seal the date above written.
JAMES NELSON. [L. s.]'
(Signed,)

"The plaintiffs gave this due bill in evidence, and closed their
case.
"The defendant's counsel then offered in evidence a paper bearing
the same date with the due bill, which was read, subject to the
opinion of the court on its competency as well as its legal effect,
and here the defendant closed.
" The due bill given in evidence by the plaintiffs, and the paper
read by the defendant, constituting all the evidence in the case, and
there being consequently no question of fact for the jury to pass
upon, the court directed the jury pro forma to return a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court on the law
arising upon the evidence.
"Two questions of law are raised by this evidence. First, whether
the instrument sued on creates any legal liability on the part of the
defewdant, which can be enforced in an action of law ?
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"And, second, whether the paper given in evidence by the defendant constitutes a valid defence? The determination of either of
those questions in favor of the defendant, will prevent a recovery in
this action.
"The difficulty the defendant has to encounter on the second question, is, that the release or receipt on which he relies is not between
the same parties as those to the due bill in suit, and there is no
evidence tending to connect them. The release purports to be the
act of the plaintiffs in the judgments-while the due bill is not to
them, but to S. F. Von Bonnhorst & Co., and there is not the
slightest evidence that the consideration of the due bill was the
indebtedness of Stackhouse & Nelson to E. F. Shcenberger and
Stephens, Shcenberger & Co., so that neither the court nor jury
would be justified in finding that the two papers relate to one and
the same transaction. This paper, then, must be rejected entirely.
"The only question, then, is, as to the sufficiency of the due bill to
support the action.
"This paper is certainly very peculiar in its terms, and at first sight
seems to favor the view taken by the defendant's counsel, that it
creates no legal liability on the part of the maker, but merely evidences a debt of honor. If this were the true construction, the
paper itself was wholly unnecessary, as a debt of honor requires no
such evidence to support it. A different construction, therefore, is
rendered necessary by the intention of the parties, as clearly manifested by the existence of the writing itself. If we look to the
contents of the instrument for its true meaning, it shows clearly the
acknowledgment, under seal, of a pre-existing debt for value received,
which was due at the date of the paper. This acknowledgment was
absolute, unqualified and unconditional, for a sum certain, payable
in money. The obligation, therefore, rests upon no condition or
contingency whatever. The clause which creates the difficulty,
then, can only have reference to the time of )ayment. The language of the obligor is not, that he will pay "if" in his opinion his
circumstances will enable him to do so; but it is "whenever" such
shall be the case: showing plainly that it refers merely to the time
of payment. What then was the intention of the parties at the
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time this obligation was given ? The debt was admitted to be then
due, so that any extension of the time of payment was a mere matter
of grace, and did not enter into, nor form any part of the consideration of the indebtedness. The intention of the parties clearly was,
that although the debt was due, yet time should be given-that the
debtor should not be pressed for payment. At most it could only
be construed into a promise not to sue-but as the debt was preexisting, and no consideration to support such a promise is shown,
it was a mere nudum pactun, and constitutes no estoppel either at
law or in equity. And besides, if time was to be given, the debtor
has had five years, which would seem to be sufficient, especially as
no allegation of inability to pay has been made by him.
"By expunging the phrase in question as inconsistent with, and
repugnant to, the body of the note, we have a perfect instrument,
creating a clear legal liability. It would then read thus: I Due S.
F. Von Bonnhorst & Co., Pittsbugh, January 10, 1852, ten hundred
and seventy-one . %%dollars, for value received. Witness my hand
and seal the date above written.' By thus rejecting the clause
under consideration, we carry out the intention of the parties and
conform to a well-settled rule of law, that the instrument is to be
taken most strongly against the contractor, regard being first had
to the apparent intent of the parties. Chitty on Contracts, 21-2.
And in furtherance of this maxim, the courts, in order to give effect
to an instrument, will reject words, in themselves clear and explicit,
which would, if allowed to operate, destroy the instrument. Thus,
when a man, for a good consideration, gave a note expressed to be
"for money borrowed, which I promise never to pay," it was held
that the word "never" should be expunged. 2 Atkins, 32. Chitty
on Con. 21. Chitty on Bills, 6 ed. 92. And on the same principle,
a bill or note, made payable to the order of a fictitious person, shall
be construed and considered as payable to bearer. 1 H. B1. 569.
By applying these principles to the case at bar, we are of opinion
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
"1Let judgment be entered for the plaintiffs on the verdict, on the
question reserved."
To this opinion the defendant's counsel excepted.
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The plaintiff in error assigned for error in this court, the rejection of S. F. Von Bonnhorst as a witness, and the entering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs below, on the reserved question.
.Afr. . -P. Hamilton, for plaintiff in error, on the first error,
cited ffimblewright vs. Armstrong, 1 Casey, 428; Biorton vs.
oTorton, 13 S. & R. 108; Krook vs. Kroofc, 4 W. & S. 127; WFork
vs. 111aclay, 2 S. & R. 415; Salmon vs. 1ouce, 3 S. & R. 811;
Browing vs. SI~ppen, 2 Bin. 154; Ralph vs. Brown, 8 W. & S.
400; Taylor v. -Fitzsimmons, 17 S. & R. 453; Harding vs. Mott,
8 Harris, 469; Hatz vs. Snyder, 2 Casey, 511; Modderwell vs.
Clevvr, 8 W. & S. 63. On the second error he argued that the
latter clause of the instrument qualifies and limits defendant's liability. Bernard vs. (iushing, 4 Mete. 230 ; Matthews vs. Ollerton,
Coneb, 218; Al. IV. Co. vs. Penlon, 4 W. & S. 212. The case
must be decided on the evidence, and not on the pleadings and evidence; the pleas do not admit that the contingency has arisen,
upon which defendant's liability depends, and there was no evidence
offered by plaintiffs below on that subject.
Mr. A. IV. Poster, for defendants in error, argued that a nominal party cannot be examined as a witness, unless by consent of
the party in interest. I Greenl. Ev. Sec. 353; 8 Taunton, 139;
4 Eng. 0. L. Rep. 49; 20 Johns. Rep. 142; 1 Wendell, 20; 13
Pickering, 125; Nelson's promise was based upon the moral obligation to pay, which existed notwithstanding the release, and was a
sufficient consideration, 2 Bin. 591; 12 S. & R. 171. If this
paper was intended as merely evidence of a moral or honorary
obligation, why put it in writing, and invest it with the solemnity
of a seal. It is plainly an acknowledgment of indebtedness, and
fixes the time of payment, when in the opinion of the obligor, he
shall be able : his ability to pay is charged in the narr, and is not
denied by the pleas; being able, as he thus admits, he must have
known the fact, and it follows as a necessary consequence, that it
must have been his opinion "that his circumstances were such as
to enable him so to do."
The plea of want of consideration cannot avail one who executes
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and delivers a specialty voluntarily; as the plaintiff in error alleges
was done here. 3 Casey, 121.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LowniE, J.-One of the simplest functions of government is that

of enforcing the contract relations of its citizens ; one of its most
difficult, is that of rightly establishing between citizens, or recognizing as established by custom, those other relations and duties
that grow out of the nature of human society, and out of the moral
principles which it recognizes as essential to good order. Government takes no active part in the institution of contract relations,
but only in the protection and enforcement of them, leaving the
citizen entirely free to enter into such relations or not, as he
pleases ; provided only that they be not inconsistent with existing
civil institutions, or with the social ideas of morality. In other
matters, government not only institutes, but enforces relations, and
it is in the exercise of this function that the greatest caution and
wisdom are required, and that the greatest wrongs to individual
liberty are apt to be inflicted.
In the present case, we have no other duty to perform than the
enforcement, and as involved therein, the interpretation of a contract
relation. The suit is on a contract, and we must ascertain what
the contract is, and enforce it according to our interpretation of
what the parties must have intended by it. If we go further, we
institute a relation not intended by the parties, and enforce what
we suppose to be a mere duty, when the plaintiffs are in form only
demanding the enforcement of a contract, and show no right to any
duty but that which it expresses.
The contract is in writing, and the defendant acknowledges himself in debt to the plaintiffs, and promises to pay them thus, "whenever in my opinion, my circumstances will enable me to do so."
As an expression of intention can anything be plainer than this.
The express contract of the parties is that the debtor is to pay
when he shall be able, and that he shall be the judge of his ability.
No doubt the parties thought this a reasonable arrangement when
they made it, though the creditors think otherwise now. If it is
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reasonable for a man to release a debt altogether, surely it is
reasonable to release the securities for a debt, not itself released,
as is done in covenants not to sue. And even if it be not reasonable, we cannot set up our reasons or the public reason for that of
the contracting parties, and make a contract for them that is contrary to their plain intention, without violating the first principles
of freedom and the very nature of contract relations.
We cannot read this contract at all as a legal obligation; for the
debtor reserves to himself the control of the remedies upon it. The
agreement to pay is here; but the right to enforce is, by mutual
consent, expressly withheld, and thus the obligation is merely a
moral one.
To say that the law will, in such a case, adjudge the debtor to
have decided that he is able to pay, whenever the court and jury
find that he is so, is only a mode of getting clear of the real contract by assuming a fictitious and constructive one. It would still
be the imposition of a duty as a contract, contrary to the expressed
intention of the parties. The instrument given in evidence does
not and cannot prove the issue on which the parties went to trial.
This view of the contract renders the other questions raised in the
trial immaterial.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendant below on the
reserved question, non obstawte veredicto.

R the Suyreme Court of Wisconsin.
AMUE

UMSDEN
T
AND WILLIAM LUMISDEN, A-PPELLANTS
OF MILWAUKEE,

VS. THE CITY

APPELLEE.

By the 11th art. of the Constitution of Wisconsin, it is provided that "no municipal corporation shall take private property for public uses, against the consent of
the owner, without the necessity thereof being first established by the verdict of a
jury." The charter of the city of Milwaukee authorized the judge of the Circuit or
County Court of Milwaukee, where land is proposed to be taken for public use, to

LUMSDEN vs. CITY OF MILWAUKEE.
appoint twelve jurors-to view the ground, determine the necessity of the taking, and
assess the damages therefor; but the Act did not in express terms require that the
jury should be sworn before entering upon their duties, or provide any mode for
swearing them: Held that the act was unconstitutional, and the proceedings thereunder void, though the jury may have been in fact sworn.

Nelson Cross, of counsel for appellants.
H. L. PalAmer and E. _yoote, of counsel for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLE, J.-In disposing of this appeal, it does not become necessary to consider and determine whether or not all the provisions of
the charter of the city of Milwaukee, which relate to the manner of
appointing a jury to view the premises, and the mode of proceeding
prescribed for establishing the necessity of taking the property for
public use, fully and substantially comply with the the second section of the eleventh article of the constitution of this State. For
the purposes of this case, it may be conceded that the jury may be
selected in the manner prescribed in the charter, and that the constitution did not contemplate the making up of an issue in a court
of record to try the question as to the necessity of appropriating
the land to the use of the public, against the consent of the owner,
and still we think thereis a fatal defect in the charter which. invalidates the whole proceding. We have not been able to find any
provision of the charter, -which, by any fair, reasonable construction,
requires that the jury appointed by the judge should be sworn
before entering upon the discharge of the duty of viewing the ground
and establishing the necessity. That it is absolutely essential to
the validity of the proceeding, that the jury, or commissioners if
you please to call them such, should act under the solemnities of an
oath, in determining the necessity, was not controverted upon the
argument of the cause, and probably will not be denied. But it is
insisted by the counsel for the appellee, that section twenty, of article six, of the act of 1852, applies to, and requires the jury appointed by the judge, to take the oath. That section reads as
follows :
" After the jurors shall have made their report as to the necessity
of taking any land under this act, and the same shall have been

LUMSDEN vs. CITY OF MILWAUKEE.

confirmed, the Common Council shall have power to appoint new
jurbrs in the place of any who shall neglect or refuse to serve; and
the jurors, before entering upon the discharge of their duties, shall
severally take an oath before some competent officer, that they are
freeholders of said city, and not interested in the premises proposed
to be taken, and that they will faithfully and impartially discharge
the trust reposed in them."
It is admitted that this is the only provision of the charter which
says anything about the jury being sworn, and the question is, can
it be construed as referring to the jury appointed by the judge in
the first instance ? We cannot perceive how such a construction
can be maintained. To determine the object and meaning of the
twentieth section, let us look at some of the other provisions of the
charter.
The act of 1852, with the amendments contained in the act of
1856, authorizes the judge of the Circuit or County Court of Milwaukee county, upon proper application, to appoint twelve jurors
to view the ground proposed to be taken for public use, and determine whether it is necessary thus to take it. Other provisions of
the two acts prescribe the manner in which the jury shall proceed to
view the premises, for the taking of such testimony as may be
offered by parties interested, and for their making a report to the
Common Council, within a certain time, of their proceedings, in
which report the jury is required to state whether, in their judgment, it is necessary to take the premises in question. It is still
further provided by other sections, that the same jury may make an
assessment of the amount of the damages to be paid to the owner
for the property proposed to be taken. It is proper to observe that
if any of the jurors appointed by the judge to view the premises are
disqualified from acting or refuse to act, the judge is authorized to
appoint others in their stead. Then in natural order comes the
twentieth section, which provides that, after the jurors shall have
made their report as to the necessity of taking any lands under the
act, and the report has been confirmed, the Common Council shall
have power to appoint new jurors in the place of any who shall
neglect or refuse to serve in determining the amount of damages to
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be paid to the owner of the property, and those jurors are required
to take an oath.
It appears to us that the natural connection and relation of the
words in the context show that the jurors spoken of in this section
were the new ones who might be appointed by the Common Council,
and not the ones appointed by the judge. It is essential that the
oath should be taken by the first jury, and the charter in clear and
unambiguous language should require it to be done. It is very
probable that it is a Casus omissus in the law, but we cannot supply
it by construction. We do not think that the charter, as it now
stands, does provide that the first jury should be sworn. It is true
it is set up in the answer, that the jury appointed to view the premises and determine the necessity of taking them for public use,
were sworn before entering upon the discharge of their duties, but
it is very manifest that if the oath was not required by the charter,
it was extra-judicial, and no indictment for perjury would lie upon
it, however clearly it might be proven that the jury, in their finding
and report, had acted most partially and corruptly. If the first
jury was not required by the charter to be sworn, they could not
determine the necessity of taking the property, within the spiritand
meaning of the constitution. Consequently the corporationderived
no right under the proceeding, to invade the land of the complainants, and make a permanent appropriation thereof, for the use of
the public.
We deem it proper to make one or two observations further upon
this section. It must be obvious, that a proceeding under this
charter to condemn and set apart property belonging to an individual, for the use of the public, is an adversary proceeding, wherein
the municipal corporation of the city of Milwaukee, representing
the public, is a party on the one side, and the person whose property it is proposed to take, is a party on the other side. By the
twentieth section, it will be seen, power is given to the Common
Council to appoint jurors (in the place of any who may neglect or
refuse to serve of those first appointed by the judge) whose duty it
is fo determine the amount of damages to be paid to the owner of
the land. A majority, or even all of the jurors selected to establish
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the necessity of taking the property, may refuse to act in fixing the
amount of damages; in which case the Common Council, one of the
parties, ex parte, may appoint a jury which shall determine the
amount of damage the city must pay. It is impossible to comment
in a proper manner upon such a provision which confounds all
our notions offairness, justice and right. Nor does it improve the
character of the provision to find that the award of the jury thus
selected must be confirmed by a resolution of the Board of Common
Council before it is binding, and that the action of the Board is
conclusive and final upon the rights of the parties interested therein,
and from which there is no appeal. [Sec. 14, chap. 6, Act, 1852;
Sec. 5, Act 1856.]
If, therefore, the corporation of the city of Milwaukee had no,
right to enter upon the land of the complainants, not having taken
those steps which it was indispensable should be taken to determine
and establish the necessity of taking it for public use; if it was
about to appropriate the land permanently to the use of the public;
we think it very proper that a court of equity should interfere by
injunction and restrain the trespass. It seems to be well settled
that courts of equity will thus interfere in such cases. See Bonaparte vs. The Camden and Amboy B. B. Co., I Bald. C. R. 206;
M.iohawkc and Hudson B. B. Co. vs. Arteher, 6 Paige, 83; 2d
Story's Eq. Jur. § 927, et seq., and cases cited in the notes.
It follows, therefore, that the order of the Circuit Court dissolving the injunction must be reversed, and the cause remandedfor further proceedings according to law.

